Dr. Jonah Onuoha
Department of Political Science
University of Nigeria, Nsukka
Abstract
Since Tres Ikle wrote his magnum Opus titled “How NationsNegotiate”, the central question has remained, what determines the outcome of International negotiations between a developing state like Nigeria and a multilateral Aid Agency such as the World Bank. The is fundamental because despite numerous agreements between Nigeria and, the World Bank, the country ‘has continued to witness increasing unemployment, double digit inflation, virtual halt in domestic capital accumulation, break-downs in the productive apparatuses and widening income inequality. To unravel the negotiation process, we anchored the study on a synthesis of the modified propendency theory and the Social Orders theory propounded by Anslem Straassi. From this theoretical exposition, the paper argues that the outcome of international negotiation between Nigeria and the World Bank is determined more by the degree of structural inequality between the two parties, than the application of negotiating strategies. In conclusion, the paper argues that as long as Nigeria continues to negotiate from the position of weakness, so long will the country continue to complain.
INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest problems facing Nigerian intellectuals is how to unravel negotiation process between Nigeria and the World Bank. Two reasons account for this development. First, negotiations are done in secret and out of public glare. Second, and perhaps more important, the agreements resulting from such negotiations are never made public or published until after twenty-five years. Consequently, very little is known about the negotiation process between a developing country like Nigeria and such a multilateral Aid Agency as the World Bank. Instructively, international negotiations between developing countries and multilateral aid agencies on the one hand and developed countries on the other has been under-studied. In fact, it is a virgin forest begging for exploration. As Bonaham (1971) observed, although the era of negotiation has begun, we know very little about the process of international negotiations.
This study has been designed to explore how the World Bank Negotiates with Nigeria. Does the World Bank dictate, rather than negotiate with the country, one may ask? Another question that has continued to agitate the minds of many Nigerians is how to explain the worsening nature of their economy in spite of the numerous agreements with the World Bank particularly in the area of Agriculture. In most cases, these negotiations have resulted in increasing unemployment, double digit inflation, virtual halt in domestic capital accumulation, break-downs in the productive apparatuses and widening income inequality. We are aware that so many variables are involved in international negotiation. However, we shall concentrate on the negotiation process. We relied on literature, documents and interview with some key actors and specialists in international negotiation and agreements between Nigeria and the World Bank in the area of food production to unravel the nature of the process.
To achieve the desired objective, the paper has been deliberately partitioned into three main sections: section one x- rays the theoretical aspect of the inquiry, establishing the appropriate theoretical framework for analyzing negotiations between parties of unequal ability and resources. Section two explores the negotiation process, while we summarized and concluded the paper in section three. The central question is, what is negotiation? This question is necessary because unless we understand the concept of negotiation, we are not likely to tackle the issues at stake.
THE MEANING AND NATURE OF NEGOTIATION
PEOPLE NEGOTIATE with one another on daily basis. As Rubin and Salacuse(1990) observed, wives negotiate with their husbands, managers negotiate with workers and nations negotiate with one another. Despite the pervasive nature of the concept of negotiation, its actual meaning is still very contentious. Unlike tangible realties, such as dog, Williams Zartman (1989) observed that concepts have no unambiguous middles. Negotiation being a concept cannot shake this boundary problem.
Essentially, the term negotiation denotes discussions between representatives of two or more sovereign states initiated with the objective of settling differences between them or concluding agreement on matters of mutual concern. As Evans and Newnham (1990) observed, negotiation is the process whereby macro- political actors interact in order to effect a number of goals that can only, or most effectively, be realized by joint agreement. The implication of the above definition is that if an actor has the capability and willingness to effect an outcome independently, then no negotiation is required. To this extent, entering into a negotiation process is a tacit recognition by the parties that their interests are complementary.
Negotiation is a process of conflict resolution. Its major objective is to persuade, convince and influence an opponent to accept your terms. In this sense, negotiation is to be distinguished from (a) resort to armed force (b) judicial methods for the settlement of contentious issues (c) imposed or dictated settlement such as the 1919 treaty of Versailles. Fred Ikied (1964) noted that there are five reasons why actors negotiate to effect outcomes. The first reason is to extend an agreement that is already in force between them, where the original understanding had a time limit. In this sense, SALT 11 agreement was an extension of SALT 1. The second reason is to normalize relationships as when two actors re-establish diplomatic relations. Another reason may be to re-distribute agreement. A redistribution of agreement involves a situation whereby parties agree to change a particular status quo. Redistribution agreements are common of the ending of a war situation. Nations may also reach agreement to establish new actors. This is called innovation agreement. The San Francisco Conference date approved the establishment of the United Nations, The Balfour Deceleration viewed with favour the establishment of a home for theJews in Palestine in 1917. Finally, negotiations may be entered into for what Ikle referred to as “inside- benefits.” Parties may negotiate simply to establish a clearer perception of each other’s goals and to make propaganda for themselves and their position.
Scholarly examination of negotiation dates backs to the 1950s. Research and writing in this area first appeared in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. Early writings by game theorists (see Luce and Raifia, 1957) focused primarily on the mathematical decision rules than can be applied to rational choice under conditions of conflicting preference between two or more players. This study was followed by several psychological treatments of conflict and negotiation, including Schelling’s (1960) classic treatise on the rational uses of non rational behaiovour, as well as Rapport’s (1960) psychologically sophisticated analysis of rational decision making in fights, games, and debates.
Walton and Mckersie (1965) provided one of the earliest and most influential treatments of negotiation in labour settings, using labour as a context in which to develop a more general formulation about the nature of negotiation. During the 1960s and 1970s, social psychologists, led by the pioneering research of Morton Deutsch (1973), Herbert Kelman (1965), and others, conducted nearly 1000 experimental studies on negotiation in the laboratory, examining the effects of a wide range of factors in negotiation process and outcome.
Experts differ on what actually constitutes a negotiation process. As Rubin and Salacuse (1990) noted, there is no single, agreed upon formulation of negotiation. Some have argued that wise negotiation, in any setting, requires disputants to begin by stating extreme positions in which they ask for far more than they ever hope to obtain. Through a series of gradual step-wise concessions, each side then moves from an extreme position towards some middle ground that gains mutual acceptance. At this point, a negotiated settlement is concluded. Proponents of this point of view include, Lax and Sebenius, (1986), Rubin and Brown (1975) and Raiffa (1982).
A second school of thought approached negotiation rather differently. Instead of analyzing negotiation as CONFRONTATION between two adversaries, each of whom is determined to get as much as possible – while surrendering little or nothing along the way-calls for greater collaboration. Each side seeks to do as well for itself as possible, but it views the other party not as an adversary in the process, but as a potential collaborator. The objective is to find ways of advancing one’s own self-interest, while leaving room for the other side to also reasonably do well. This collaborative problem solving approach argues fiat opportunities for joint gain result when negotiators are able to metaphorically swing their chairs around so that, instead of facing each other, they are side by side, instead of confronting each other, they are jointly confronting a problem that challenges them both.
Although these two approaches to the study of negotiation would appear to rest on rather different assumptions about the nature of the process, they are actually very much a like in one key respect. In fact, both points of view are best suited to the kind of negotiation that takes place between parties of roughly equal power. Whether two poor countries or two super powers are involved, as long as neither party has the power to impose agreement on the other, and the parties acknowledge their independence, there is room and opportunity for negotiation.
The key question, however, is this: what happens when the parties are not of equal strength? In other words, what-happens when one side has far more power than the other? Scholars are yet to address the question of negotiation between unequal parties in any significant way. In the international arena, this type of negotiation takes place most often when a developing country such as Nigeria interacts with a super power or a multilateral aid agency, such as the World Bank. Without exaggeration, it can be argued that the problem of negotiation under conditions of power inequality is one of the toughest problems confronting scholars in this area. It is clear from the above that a serious gap exists in the literature, particularly how a developing state such as Nigeria negotiate with a multilateral aid agency, such as World Bank. For us to properly analyze the negotiation process, we need to anchor it on a theoretical framework.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING NIGERIA – WORLD BANK NEGOTIATIONS
Our theoretical framework will be anchored on a synthesis of the modified dependency theory and the social order theory of negotiation propounded by Anselm Strauss (1979).
The concept of “dependency” was coined by a Brazzillian sociologist, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. However, A.G. Frank is often credited with formulating the original version of the Dependency Theory. His Book titled: Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, written in the early 1960s and published in English in 1967 can be taken to be the opening salvo in the debate over dependency theory.
Frank presented this theory as a contribution to development economics and wants it to be seen alongside neo- classical theories viz: structuralist theories and traditional Marxist theories all of which he sees as competitors for the explanation of the present condition of the less developed countries. He used the concept of dependency to categorise relations of power and control such that the course of development in the underdeveloped nations or satellite is determined by that of the developed nations or metropole. The consequence of these relationships for the satellite is that certain problems such as poverty and distorted development are accelerated and the satellite is further disadvantaged (Frank, 1986).
Johan Galtung has improved on A. G. Frank’s effort. In a journal article titled “structural theory of imperialism,” he argued that the world consists of ‘centre’ nations and “periphery” nations. According to him, there is a harmony of interest between the centre states, especially the centre of the centre and the centre of the periphery. Also a disharmony of interest exists between centre of the periphery and periphery of the periphery.
This theory is useful for our understanding of the process of negotiation between Nigeria and the World Bank because there is a structural inequality between the World Bank and its mentors on the one hand, and a underdeveloped state such as Nigeria on the other. While the World Bank belongs to the centre of the centre, Nigeria falls within the centre of the periphery. Instructively, the World Bank does not operate on the principle of one country, one vote, but according to the axiom: “the richer the country and the greater its stock in the bank, the greater its weight in the decision-making process”. Five countries dominate the international aid agency namely the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, France and Japan, with the United states having by far the largest stock and voice.
Basically, the relationship between Nigeria and these principal actors in the World Bank is characterized by inequality. This inequality can be empirically demonstrated with certain indices, namely the country’s share of total world trade, per capita income of member countries their per capita food consumption; their levels of development in science and technology; their life span and mortality rate of their citizens.
While the dependency theory is fundamental to our understanding of the issues at stake, some modifications of the theory are necessary to make it useable for this exploratory study. They first modification is a total rejection of the harmony of interest that is said to exist between the centre of the centre and centre of the periphery. Our argument is that if such harmony actually exists, Nigerian leaders will not be lamenting of western exploitation and domination.
Secondly, such assumption totally rules out the issue of maneuverability during negotiations between the centre states and centre of the periphery states. The true position is that in any relationship between the centre states and periphery states, each state guards and protects its national interest jealously and employs appropriate negotiating strategies and tactics to secure higher pay-offs in such relationship.
The application of the modified version of the dependency theory to our present study will become clearer in the context of the social order theory of negotiation. The central message of this theory is that structural conditions under which agreements are negotiated affect how actors see social order and what they believe to be possible or impossible, problematic or probable. The implication of this theory is that as the structural context changes, the outcome of negotiation will ipso facto change. According to Strauss (1978), virtually anything and everything can be affected by the changing and structural contingencies, including the implied stakes; the guiding strategies, the associated tactics, the number of participants, the issues and alternative models of action.
From this theoretical exposition, one may conclude that the outcome of international negotiations between Nigeria and the World Bank is determined more by the degree of structural inequality between the two parties, than the application of negotiating strategies. In most cases, the World Bank and IMF usually threaten wholesale international financial boycott to frighten those countries that may not be ready to adopt and implement their particular type of adjustment policies. By using their carrot and stick principle to deal with developing countries, including Nigeria, the IMF and the World Bank act in the settled knowledge that the various Western creditor institutions, organized mainly in the Paris and London clubs, will only keep lines of credit open for and advance new loans to their developing country debtors, if the latter concludes an agreement for economic stabilization with them.
Not surprisingly, the IMF and the World Bank have not hesitated to exploit this leverage when they have to force most Third World governments, including Nigeria to adopt adjustment programmes preferred by the Bretton woods twins. Being aware that non-agreement with the IMF and World Bank may create unbearable economic hardship, the developing countries, including Nigeria ab initio get tensed-up and behave as directed by the Victor.
The situation is even more compounded by the fact that Nigeria needs foreign exchange desperately if it must survive. This desire for economic progress and technical advancement is common to all the new states. The desperate attitude of the developing countries, including Nigeria in search of the ‘hard currency’ usually extended to them
Basically, the relationship between Nigeria and these principal actors in the World Bank is characterized by inequality. This inequality can be empirically demonstrated with certain indices, namely the country’s share of total world trade, per capita income of member countries their per capita food consumption; their levels of development in science and technology; their life span and mortality rate of their citizens.
While the dependency theory is fundamental to our understanding of the issues at stake, some modifications of the theory are necessary to make it useable for this exploratory study. They first modification is a total rejection of the harmony of interest that is said to exist between the centre of the centre and centre of the periphery. Our argument is that if such harmony actually exists, Nigerian leaders will not be lamenting of western exploitation and domination.
Secondly, such assumption totally rules out the issue of maneuverability during negotiations between the centre states and centre of the periphery states. The true position is that in any relationship between the centre states and periphery states, each state guards and protects its national interest jealously and employs appropriate negotiating strategies and tactics to secure higher pay-offs in such relationship.
The application of the modified version of the dependency theory to our present study will become clearer in the context of the social order theory of negotiation. The central message of this theory is that structural conditions under which agreements are negotiated affect how actors see social order and what they believe to be possible or impossible, problematic or probable. The implication of this theory is that as the structural context changes, the outcome of negotiation will ipso facto change. According to Strauss (1978), virtually anything and everything can be affected by the changing and structural contingencies, including the implied stakes; the guiding strategies, the associated tactics, the number of participants, the issues and alternative models of action.
From this theoretical exposition, one may conclude that the outcome of international negotiations between Nigeria and the World Bank is determined more by the degree of structural inequality between the two parties, than the application of negotiating strategies. In most cases, the World Bank and IMF usually threaten wholesale international financial boycott to frighten those countries that may not be ready to adopt and implement their particular type of adjustment policies. By using their carrot and stick principle to deal with developing countries, including Nigeria, the IMF and the World Bank act in the settled knowledge that the various Western creditor institutions, organized mainly in the Paris and London clubs, will only keep lines of credit open for and advance new loans to their developing country debtors, if the latter concludes an agreement for economic stabilization with them.
Not surprisingly, the IMF and the World Bank have not hesitated to exploit this leverage when they have to force most Third World governments, including Nigeria to adopt adjustment programmes preferred by the Bretton woods twins. Being aware that non-agreement with the IMF and World Bank may create unbearable economic hardship, the developing countries, including Nigeria ab initio get tensed-up and behave as directed by the Victor.
The situation is even more compounded by the fact that Nigeria needs foreign exchange desperately if it must survive. This desire for economic progress and technical advancement is common to all the new states. The desperate attitude of the developing countries, including Nigeria in search of the ‘hard currency’ usually extended to themcountry they intend to invest in with concise terms of reference, guidelines, and checklist of issues to be reviewed. Members of this mission usually include the country loans officer, country economist, a procurement/disbursement specialist and appropriate staff from concerned technical departments (Agriculture, Transport and Industry).
The second stage, according to him, is the programme description stage. To achieve the objective of this stage, a three-day workshop is usually organized which will embrace all concerned parties. The programme preparation document will then be written in coherent manner, around the logical framework matrix. The report will include analysis of the institutional capabilities of the borrower organizations which will handle the programme loan funds, in particular, the ministry of finance, the Central Bank and the Internal Audit Department.
In our efforts to find out how Nigeria negotiates, we interviewed Dr O. O. Soleye, former Finance minister during the Buhari – Idiagbon regime. This minister was in office when the multi-state Agricultural Development Project was negotiated. The agreement was signed on the 20th of September, 1985, just a month after KaluIdikaKalu took over from him.
According to the former minister, the Nigeria World Bank negotiations pertaining to food production passed through six different stages. The first stage was the project identification stage. This stage started when the Federal Government signified its intention to the World Bank for the commencement of negotiation in the area of food production. Encouraged by the bright prospects in Nigeria, the Bank dispatched its mission to the country in early 1972. When the Bank’s identification mission arrived Nigeria, it identified Funtua in Kaduna state, Gusau in Sokoto state and Gombe in Bauchi state as locations for the demonstration farms for the World Bank’s Agricultural Development Projects in Nigeria.
The second stage was the PROJECT PREPARATION STAGE. This stage started when the World Bank Identification mission submitted its reports to the World Bank Headquarters on the feasibility of the intended project. The report emphasized the role of the Nigeria small -holder as the center piece of food production and stressed the importance of the (ADP) Agricultural Development Project as a vehicle for reaching the poor peasant farmers.
The Federal Government was opposed to the small-holder approach on the ground that large-scale farming was more desirable. This disagreement between the Bank and Nigeria led to the formation of a Joint Strategies Mission which was composed of representatives of the Government and World Bank Officials. However, when the committee produced its report, the World Bank’s view prevailed.
During our interview with the Former Minister, DrSoleye, we wanted to know whether it was normal for a borrowing country to accept whatever terms the bank dictates. He reacted as follows:
-You don’t just accept the terms without negotiations. However, you can bend the terms without breaking them totally. If you refuse the terms totally, the loan will not be given to you.
During our interview with Dr E. Nwagbo who was working as the technical expert in-charge of project preparation at the Federal Agricultural Co- ordinating Unit, Abuja, he noted that most of the negotiations take place at the stage of programme preparation. According to him,
The project to be funded is first prepared and appraised. Federal Government makes an input during both preparation and appraisal, selecting and rejecting elements of the projects that are not acceptable. By the time you reach the negotiation stage, only very few differences exist.
The true position is that negotiation does take place on certain issues, while some issues are not open to negotiation. As Nwagbo noted, the interest rates are fixed, so are the grace periods and the repayment period. More importantly, the World Bank insists that each project must conform with the tenets of economic and financial viability. In fact, the issue of economic and financial viability is not open to negotiations. However, a borrowing country can negotiate on such details as the number of foreign experts, the time frame, mode of importation of raw materials etc. When it comes to “take-it or leave-it” situation, the borrowing country must adjust if it really wants the loan.
It is important to note that when a borrower is desperate to have an agreement, it bargains from a position of weakness. This partially explains why, in the small-holder/big farmer controversy, the World Bank’s view prevailed in spite of Federal Government’s preference for large scale farming. Nigeria was anxious to secure the World Bank’s loan to improve the agricultural sector and did not want anything to stop it. On the part of the World Bank, it had been its standing policy since 1973 to emphasize the role of the small farmer in their loans to the agricultural sector of the developing countries. It did not want to abandon this policy for the sake of one Third World Country.
The disagreement between Nigeria and the World Bank had not been resolved when the Funtua Agricultural Department project loan Agreement was signed in 1975. The Federal Government could not wait for the outcome of the issue due to its eagerness to be seen to be doing something in the agricultural sector.
The third important stage is the APPRAISAL STAGE. At this stage, the Bank staff review comprehensively and systematically all aspects of the project. At the end of this process, an appraisal report is prepared on the basis of the input made by the Bank’s field staff to the Headquarters. After it is reviewed, this report becomes the basis of negotiation with the borrower. This appraisal has various components namely, cost and finance (including a detailed project description), borrowing and executing agencies, an analysis of the borrower’s institutions that will be administering the project, design standards and project specification, project implementation, financial analysis and recommendation.
The fourth and most important stage is the BARGAINING stage. This stage involves discussions with the borrower on the measures needed to ensure the success of the project. As Dunmoye (1988) noted, after the Bank’s Board of Directors have agreed to give the loan, a memorandum containing the conditions under which the loan will be offered will then be forwarded to the Federal Government. The Government may at this stage, terminate the process if it finds all the terms unacceptable. In that case, the Government will reimburse the Bank for the Consultants who have been paid by the Bank in American dollars from the anticipated loans. This makes such a decision very difficult to take by the borrower.
For example, the former Governor of Kaduna state, AlhajiBalarabe Musa protested against World Bank’s food production programme in the state because one of the rerms of that loan Agreement required vesting the management of the programme in the hands of the World Bank officials. He argued that it was not in the national interest of Nigeria to SURRENDER to the World Bank the management of a programme, which directly affects the lives and destiny of millions of Nigeria peasants. Another thorny issue was the Bank’s insistence that consultants, preferably foreigners who will ensure that the terms of the Agreement are fully implemented be employed. Schedule 6, section 11 of the multi-state Agricultural Development project Loan Agreement of 1985 stated as that:
The borrower and the project state shall employ consultants whose
qualifications, experience and terms of conditions of employment shall
be satisfactory to the bank.
Among them are project managers, financial controllers, chief agriculturists, commercial service managers and chief engineers. In schedule 1, section 4 of the Ayangba Project Loan Agreement (1977), the sum of $3.5 million was set aside in respect of internationally recruited staff.
One implication of the above term of Agreement is that a substantial amount of money from the loan must be committed to foreign staff remuneration and fringe benefits. The former Governor of Kaduna refused to accept this term of the Agreement when he observed that the remuneration and fringe benefits of the 45 key staff would cost the state N60 million within the first five years of the project. This N60 million was about two-thirds (%) of the entire loan of about £4100 million.
In spite, of this protest, negotiations continued in 1983 after the Governor was impeached by the National Party of Nigeria (NPN)-dominated state legislature and a new loan of $122.0 million was approved for the state by the World Bank in 1984. This scenario demonstrates the fact that the Bank will always have its way in most cases. Clearly, they may make concessions to Nigeria only on issues that do not challenge the core orientation and policy of the Bank.
After the negotiation; comes the signing of the Agreement. Two documents are involved. The first is the project loan agreement while the second is the one that contains the procedures for implementation. In most cases, the Nigerian Ambassador to the United States at the particular time signs the project agreement on behalf of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, while the Bank’s Vice President for Africa Signs for the International Financial Institution.
The signing of the agreement is quickly followed by next stage, which is the IMPLEMENTATION and SUPERVISION stage. According to the ADP Agreement, the borrower is responsible for the implementation of the project, while the Bank is responsible for supervising that implementation through progress reports from the borrower and periodic field trips. Essentially the Bank has dual functions during this stage. First, it acts as a “watch dog” to ensure the proper use of the proceeds of the loan, including the supervision of internationally competitive bidding or other procurement procedures. Second, the Bank plays the role of “trouble shooter” by working with the implementing agency to identify and solve problems that threaten the timely execution of the project.
During the period of implementation, Quarterly Reports must be prepared and submitted to the Bank on the project’s progress. This is known as Back- to- Office Report (BTOR). Bank also visits occasionally on a supervisory mission to ensure that there is no deviation from the document of the loan agreement during the period of implementation. The period of implementation is usually set for between four to five years. After the implementation of the project, an END of LOAN REPORT or Completion Report is prepared by the Bank’s staff with the assistance of Nigerian technocrats attached to the project.
The final stage is the EVALUATION STAGE. This stage follows the final disbursement of the Bank Funds for the project. An independent department of the Bank known as the OPERATIONS EVALUATIONS DEPARTMENT reviews the completion report of the Bank’s project staff and prepares its own audit of the project, after receiving materials from the Headquarters through field trips. This evaluation provides lessons of experience which are built into subsequent identification, preparation or appraisal work.
The above analysis of the negotiating process demonstrates the fact that the World Bank is in control of who gets what, how, and when. This explains why J. Gana of Ahmadu Bello University described the ADPS as World Bank Directed and not World Bank Assisted.
In fact, the popular understanding in Nigeria today is that the World Bank dictates, rather than negotiates with the Government. Although this is not totally true as we have tried to show, the behaviour of Government functionaries who are associated with the projects reinforce this belief. For example, when a particular community in Ilorin did not like the manner in which one of the ADPS was being implemented especially in matters relating to the siting of the project’s headquarters, they were forced by the Nigerian Governments silence to send a delegation to the Bank’s headquarters in Washington D.C. to protest. As Dunmoye (1986) noted, the Nigerian Government gave the impression that the -Bank had the final say on the matter. When there was a disagreement at the Governmental level on the state-wide Agricultural Development Project (ADP) in Kaduna state, the state Government protested that rather than SURRENDER to the Bank, it would withdraw from the project (New Nigerian, 20/11/80).
In Ilorin, the Kwara state Government refused to release the finding and government white paper on the probe of the activities of the Ilorin ADP until the Bank had seen and approved the report. As the Commissioner for Agriculture, Dr Jide Matanm; noted, the Government did not want to antagonize the World Bank by releasing the white paper to the public. All this demonstrates the fact that Nigeria negotiates with the World Bank from the position of weakness. As long as this weakness continues, so long will the country continue to complain.
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