Felix C. Asogwa, PhD
Department of political science
Enugu State University of Science
and Technology, Enugu
Abstract
This study derives from our concern for the problem of environmental degradation in a third world state like Nigeria since the beginning of the 1990s. This problem has generated socio-political conflict of wide dimensions in the Nigerian society. Engaged in the conflict are the Multinational Oil Companies, the Nigerian State, and the Oil Producing Communities located principally in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. This socio-political conflict has led to unquantifiable loss, both in terms of human and material losses to the Nigerian society. To that extent, it became imperative that urgent and concrete measures should be taken to bring the situation under control. This study, therefore, set for itself to account for the rampant incidence of environmental degradation in most third world states like Nigeria. It equally delved into the reasons behind the high level of socio-political conflict associated with the environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. These are dimensions of environmental degradation in Nigeria which scholars have tended to neglect. It is by filling this gap that this study makes its contribution to the on-going search for the resolution of the intractable issue of environmental degradation and the resultant conflict especially, in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.
Introduction
Environmental degradation can be simply defined as the reduction in the quality of the natural conditions such as land, air, water, in which people, animals and plants depend for their livelihood brought about in this case through oil exploration and pollution. Scholars have tried to explain the issue of environmental degradation globally and Africa in particular from diverse but often conflicting perspectives. But a dominant trend that is discernible both among Western and African Scholars is the assumption that poverty constitutes the greatest threat to environmental degradation in Africa. One frequently encounters the hypothesis that there is a strong positive correlation between poverty and environmental degradation. The ideological underpinning of this view is not in doubt. It has been argued for instance, that environmental degradation is perpetrated by the poor in the African society, ‘and at the international level, the greatest threat to ecological security is attributed to the “vicious circle” in the developing countries especially Africa. Thus, according to Stokke (1991:27)there is also an appeal to shared interest with reference to environment as poverty constitutes the main cause of environmental degradation in the third world countries. Frisch (1992:44), also argues that; The quest for sustainable development in Africa … is also an acknowledgement of the fact that poverty is the chief cause of the deterioration of the environment. This thesis was elaborated by the United Nations Panel of Experts on development and environmental in Switzerland in 1977 when it noted that; the environmental problem of developing countries (including Africa) falls broadly into two categories – the problems arising out of poverty or inadequate development itself and the problems that arise out of the process of development. The problems in the first category are reflected in the poor social and economic conditions that prevail in both the rural and urban areas. For most developing countries these are by far, the problems of greatest importance (Donald (ed), 1992:5).Other Scholars that share this view on poverty and environmental degradation in Africa include; Willbank (1994), Woehickle (1992), Roche (1991), Read (1994) etc.
But the Niger Delta region experience in Nigeria seems to be at variance with the conventional wisdom. An empirical study of environmental degradation in the region not only provides sharp contradiction to this dominant view on poverty – environmental degradation relationship, but also shows that the worst forms of environmental degradation is not perpetrated by the poor but the consequence of monopoly capitalism in tacit collusion with the state. Years of massive impoverishment of the Niger Delta people in colonial and post-colonial periods through ecological devastation and pollution resulting from the operations of the multinational oil companies in alliance with the Nigerian state, not only exacerbated the economic plight of the rural poor in this river-rine Niger Delta, but created such antagonistic social relations of production and distribution that could not be contained except through violent clash with the Nigerian state (Eteng, 1997).
It is against this background that the present work examines the role of monopoly capitalism and a peripheral capitalist type of the Nigerian State in generating environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region and at the same time pretending to resolve it. Specifically, the study investigates the role of the Nigerian State in both the crisis in Niger Delta region and the attempts made first to contain it, and secondly, to resolve it including the wider context which the latter generated in the aftermath of the killing of Saro- Wiwa and his associates in 1995. In order to investigate the nefarious company/government role in the crisis, three important questions are addressed;
i) What is the relationship between the character and role of the Nigerian State in the international political economy and the environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region?
ii) What are the attendant socio-political conflict in the degradation? and;
iii) What role did the Nigerian state play in the conflict?
The Background: The Niger Delta Region of Nigeria
In recent times Scholars have increasingly recognized the importance of geography
in shaping human history. As Niven (1950:1) aptly noted;… the shape and position, the hills and valleys of a country, control far more than the direction of roads or railways and the flow of trade. The feelings and spirit of the people depend much on the geography of the country in which they live, and so do many details of its administrative machine and even its constitution. The truism in the above observation is clearly demonstrated in the Niger DeltaRegion of Nigeria.The Niger Delta lies on the Southern reaches of Nigeria bounded by theAtlantic Ocean (Dike, 1956: 19). In size, it covers about 25,600 square kilometers,thus making it the largest in Africa (Osuntokun (ed), 1998:76). Dike (1956:20),offers a useful insight into the ecology of the region when he observed thus; Geographically the Niger Delta divides easily into two sections. The Northern section is comparatively drier and higher than the area of swamp land in the south. Even in the low land belt, the dark and humid surroundings are interspersed with vast starches of dry land, a maze of islands intersected by creeks and rivers, and on these settlements have been built… The sea bird trading communities which emerged with this commerce transcends tribal boundaries.
The Niger Delta was originally known as the Oil Rivers protectorate and was then misconstrued to run from the Benin River in the West to the Cameroons in the East. But in 1983, the eastern boundary was narrowed down to, exclude the Cameroons. By the turn of the century, it was discovered that the Cross River which waters the Calabar and Ogoja Provinces rose from the Cameroon mountains and had no bearing with the Niger. Contemporary opinion, therefore, is that the Niger Delta ends with the banks of Imo and Opobo Rivers in the East and in the West beyond the neighbourhood of Escavos (Dike, 1956:19).
The Niger Delta is inhabited by some 20 ethnic groups in the five states of Nigeria – Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Akwa-Ibom and Cross River States – with the first three constituting over 90 percent of the region. The area has a combined population of about seven Million People (1991 Census) while the ethnic groups include; Ijaw, Isoko, Itshekiri, Urobo, Ikwere, Kalahari, Bonny, Akasa, Ndoni, Andono, Opobo, Ekpaye, Efik, Ibibio, Okirika, Nembe, Ogoni, Abua, Ogbia, Ndoki, Ogba, Egbema, Igbos etc. (Akinyele, 1998:77). The environmental setting of the Niger Delta no doubt shaped the economic activities in the area. The predominant economic activity in the region is mainly agricultural production (farming and fishing).
Politically, the communities in the Niger Delta region had seldom been administered together before the independent period. The unity of the region had been however recognized as far back as 1890 when the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce criticized the political balkanization of the Niger Delta. In a letter to Lord Rosebury, the foreign Secretary, the Chamber noted; The operation of two separate and conflicting jurisdictions and fiscal systems in the Niger Delta is the more to be deplored since nature had made of the Delta, whether its political name be Niger Territories or Oil Rivers Protectorate, one great district transversed by water ways so numerous and interlaced that it is impossible to create an artificial division for fiscal and other purposes without materially interfering with the liberty of the natives and the natural course of bade (Akinyele, 1998).
Even though this unity among the people of the Delta region has been historically recognized, traditionally, each tribal group or settlement evolved its own peculiar political organization. Generally, what was obtainable among most of these groups was a decentralized political arrangement even though few areas such as Bonny and Warn have centralized political system. In the contemporary Nigerian Political Organisation, the Niger Delta region has remained very focal. This is not only as a result of its rich mineral endowment, but also the level of political agitation that has been associated with the area. (Akintola, 2004)
Class Interest and Niger Delta Environmental Degradation
To understand more the issues involved in the oil production and environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region, we shall identify the various classes involved. They include;
a) The metropolitan Bourgeoisie who are the owners and directors of the multinational oil companies,
b) The Nigerian comprador bourgeoisie whose interests are constitutively linked to foreign capital. They align with the metropolitan bourgeoisie that are the owners of these oil companies, and in Nigeria, they ‘are predominantly those who control the apparatus of state power and invariably the government (Turner 1976:63),
c) The petty bourgeoisie who are the main wage earning managerial staff of oil companies. Most of them are Nigerians. They also include the enlightened groups and chiefs who often represent their respective communities in mediational representation to the government and oil companies. They also include the small traders who sell spare parts and industrial goods to these oil companies. Thus, they benefit immensely from the oil business.
d) The working class composed of those who bring only their labour power into production ((Nikitin, 1983:38). They are the direct producers of the oil.
e) Finally, we have the peasantry, who are mainly agricultural producers such as the farmers and fisher men. They constitute the dominated class. It is their farm lands and fish ponds that oil exploration and exploitation activities have adversely degraded.
In the light of the above classification, we shall proceed to show how the environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region resulted from the alliance of interest between the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the Nigerian comprador class.
The genesis of the existing alliance of interest between the metropolitan bourgeoisie class and the Nigerian comprador bourgeoisie class can be located in the manner and the character of the integration of Nigeria like other African states into the global capitalist system (Rodney, 1972:32). This integration was the outcome of the logic of internal contradictions within the Western capitalist system around the late 19l century. The internal contradictions was to propel the exportation of capital into foreign lands especially Africa (including Nigeria) in search of both market and source of raw materials by the Western capitalists. This eventually culminated in the systematic integration of these foreign lands into western capitalism (Nwankwo, 1999). But the integration was done in a manner detrimental to sustainable development in these societies as it created dependency and unequal relationships (Buzeuv, 1987: 129).
Guevara (1972:9) in analyzing the character of the African economies aptly described this integration thus;… the characteristics of African economies are not fortuitous, they correspond strictly to the nature of the capitalist system in full expansion which transfers to the dependent countries the most abusive and barefaced forms of exploitation.
The integration of Nigerian economy to Western capitalism was made possible through the creation of special class of middle men. Kay (1976), Amin (1976) and Rey (1976), have all argued that the expanding world capitalist economy first articulated with peripheral economies by creating a class of merchant capitalists. This class ensured the transfer of the commodities of the third world to the developed capitalist countries at a rate of exchange favourable to the latter, but did not in itself engage in or organize, the production process itself (Roxborough, 1979:68).
As Rodney (1972:56) noted; One of the most decisive features of the colonial system was the presence of Africans serving as economic, political and cultural agents of European colonists. These agents or compradors were already serving the European interests in the pre-colonial period.
These officials and notables depended on such relationship for their income and status. At independence, the colonial concern still interested in continuing the business of extraction in Nigeria prepared a group of Nigerians that has foreign links and handed over power to them so as to ensure and facilitate the continued exploitation of the nation’s resources. Affirming this assertion, Turner (1980:204), stated that, “From independence, Nigeria has been governed by a neo-colonial comprador state which lacks coherence and stability. The description ‘neo-colonial’ is useful as a means of indicating that, in the transition from colonialism to independence, political power was transferred to a regime based on the support of social classes linked very closely to the foreign interest which was formerly represented by the colonial state. This critical link was in the common interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the Nigerian bourgeoisie. It created inter dependence through complementary by encouraging specialization in the primary production of raw materials needed by the metropole while metropole specialized in manufacture. (Ake, 1981 :36). Ibeanu (1997: 13) illuminated this view when he observed that;
After thirty-six years of political independence from Britain, the Nigerian economy is one that continues to pursue essentially the colonial project of exporting primary products and importing finished ones especially consumer goods.
This has even become more so with the new status of oil in Nigeria’s economy. The Nigerian state depends 80 percent of its revenue and 95 percent of her foreign exchange earnings on oil. (Obi, 1999:42). There is a broad division of labour in this alliance between the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the Nigerian comprador bourgeoisie especially, in the extraction of these mineral resources in Nigeria particularly oil. While the indigenous bourgeoisie class ensures the political conditions for capital accumulation, the metropolitan capital attends to production, providing both technology and some of the capital required in the accumulation process, (Obaseki, 2003).
This relation is crucial for both classes as it enables the metropolitan bourgeoisie to make super profit with less inhibition and for the Nigerian comprador ruling bourgeoisie, it gives them leverage to primitive accumulation denied them especially during colonial era. Thus, Ekekwe (1986: 103), argues that this explains why the Nigerian ruling class and other elements looked up to the state and also used it as an effective medium through which they could initiate or enhance capital accumulation. Therefore politics and access to state became more attractive than entrepreneurship as a vehicle for accumulation of funds (Joseph, 1983:22).
It is within the above context that oil exploration activities are carried in the
Niger Delta. Environmental degradation has become so pervasive in the area as a result of the deliberate or apparent neglect by both oil companies and the Nigerian state in providing adequate measures in minimizing such degradation. This attitude of the dominant social forces in the oil business in the Niger Delta region becomes clear when one recognizes that those who suffer the impacts mostly are the peasant class. Thus as Ake (1976:6), noted, public policy in Nigeria has often on a blatant manner been detrimental to mass interest. The point is that the state is constituted in such a way that it reflects mainly the interest of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the Nigerian bourgeoisie. The fact again as Ihonubere and Shaw (1988:41) noted, is that; The transnational corporation which dominate the production and marketing processes involved in oil, can manipulate the direction of state policies. The relations of the rentier state with foreign capital often necessitate conditions of alliance or coalition against labour and peasantry.
The principal concern of the state and the multinational oil companies in the oil business is the maximization of profit even at the expense of total degradation of the sources of the livelihood of the peasant farmers in the Niger Delta region. The slogan seems to be that of “business as usual at all cost”. Eteng (1997:1 – 37) elucidated this point better when he observed that;… the oil exploration policy of Nigerian state is exploitative and expriopriatory. This state policy is deliberately designed to create a permanent endowment/ownership exchange entitlement disequilibrium fundamentally contradictory and inimical to the socio-economic sustenance and even survival of the oil bearing enclave inhabitants.
The alliance, therefore, became that characterized by protection of multinational interest, ranging from legislation made in the interest of the oil companies for the security of equipment and oil installations from local aggression and other threats that are capable of disrupting exploration and exploitation of oil. The multinationals on their part will ensure effective and continuous production of hydro-carbon (oil) that guaranteed enough revenue to fund economic development and accumulation process (Pegg, 1999). As Turner (1980:204), rightly pointed out, “bureaucratic compradors in Nigeria may also receive consideration for taking decision favourable to foreign firms or refraining from making or enforcing provision unfavourable to them”.
The Socio-Political Conflict in the Niger Delta Region
The attendant socio-political conflict in the Niger Delta region could be explained from the wider context of the on-going intra-class struggle in the Nigerian society. The intra-class struggle in Nigeria is defined by the character of her ruling class as created by the colonial political economy (Eteng, 1998: 1 – 31). As a result of the policy of economic exclusionism pursued by the colonialists, the dominant group that inherited the state apparatus after independence was economically, weak. This, therefore, explains why the Nigerian entrepreneurs and other elements looked up to the state and also used it as an effective medium for capital accumulation (Ake, 1983 :89).
The central role of the state in the political economy of the post-independence Nigeria was what set the tone for the pattern of politics and intra class struggle and consequently for the character of the dominant bourgeoisie class in the country. In this struggle among the dominant class, all forms of available instruments and tactics such as ethnic chauvinism, religious sentiments, ecological problems and other sectional sentiments are employed to ensure victory.
It is against this background that we can appreciate and explain the sociopolitical conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The discovery of oil in commercial quantity in Nigeria in 1958 – 1962 no doubt enhanced the lucrativeness of the state power, thereby, increasing the intensity of the intra-class struggle among the bourgeois class for its control (Tanzer, 1969). Coincidentally, majority of these oil producing communities are located within the minority ethnic groups. Therefore, the faction of this bourgeois class located among these minority ethnic groups had hoped to use the strategic importance of oil in the Nigerian economy to improve their position in the geo-politics of Nigeria. This is because, oil has become the economic life blood of the Nigerian state (AnamNdu, shows that they are only but pursuing their narrow class interest. It is on record that embezzlement and misappropriation has largely been associated with the compensatory programmes put in place by the Federal government especially the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMP ADEC), and even the current Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). These programmes never really succeeded in achieving their intended objectives as a result. As one critic theatrically posited “OMPADEC should be given pass mark for the erection of sign boards indicating projects that were neither started nor half completed” (Akinyele, 1998:85). ‘
Finally, when most of the leaders of these oil bearing communities had one appointment or other and were getting regular contract from the Federal government, they never paid serious attention to the issue of environmental degradation in their communities. Most of them only became active when they were no more getting this largesse. Therefore, they cannot be pursuing the interest of the masses of the people but their selfish class interest.
The Roles of the Nigerian State in the Conflict
In the preceding section of the work, we suggested that the conflict in the Niger Delta region has lingered principally because of lack of consensus among the dominant bourgeoisie class in Nigeria which has given rise to intense intra-class rivalry. In this circumstance, the role of the Nigerian state through the Federal government should have been to reconcile these opposing interests of the factions of the bourgeoisie class in Nigeria. But the Nigerian state has been unable to play this role as a result of its basic character. It has not been able to rise above social contradictions and therefore cannot be seen as an impartial arbiter. According to Ibeanu (1996:6), instead of appearing as a representation of the general interests of the Nigerian people, the Nigerian state is “privatized,” “parcelled,” “prebendal,” and a “means of production,” used in the name of regional, ethnic, religious, class and other special interests. To that extent, the Nigerian state and its government has been most ineffective in resolving the crisis.
The attempt made by the Nigerian state at the resolution of the conflict depicts her as promoting and protecting factional interest. In trying to resolve this conflict which no doubt impinges on the interest of the entire bourgeoisie class in Nigeria as it affects the level of oil production thereby reducing the resources available for their primitive accumulation, the Federal government of Nigeria has employed various strategies and tactics.
Primarily, the Federal government has employed repressive mechanism. The coercive instrument of the state such as the Police, Army, Navy have been involved in the application of force to suppress the agitation of the people of the Niger Delta region. Hence, they have been bullied, terrorized, intimidated, brutalized, maimed, killed etc in order to abandon the struggle. The most celebrated of these was the execution of the Ogoni activist, Ken Saro- Wiwa in 1995 and the Odii Massacre.
232002).
It should be observed that the rising profile of oil on official Nigerian circle was closely related to the class character of the Nigerian state in which the emergent domestic ruling class used their position in state institution to capture economic resources. It, therefore, caused a great deal of further dis affection between the ruling class faction of the oil producing areas and those of the non-oil producing sub-nationalities. It became a source of conflict between the factions of the Nigerian ruling class who sometimes resort to the pursuit of their factional interest by mobilizing the people along the line of factional nationalistic ideology or even patriotism, as a means of enlisting support to get a larger chunk of the national (oil) cake. The struggle became more intense and pronounced from the early 1980s. This is as a result of the diminishing revenue base of the Federal government following the collapse of the world oil market and of the depression which ensued on the early 1980s (Olusanya, 1984:55).
This position was further justified by the fact that the process of oil exploration and production were directing environmental havoc on the oil producing areas and destroying all forms of economic activities. The oil producing communities, therefore, became more restive pressing the Federal government for a greater share of the country’s diminishing oil revenue, a halt to their marginalization from Federal political power structure, compensation for increasing environmental damage … (Olukoshi and Agbu, 1995:8). All these are geared towards justifying the demand for greater share of the oil producing areas. The moves made by the Federal government to assuage the feelings of the people of the oil producing areas, were seen not to be enough as they have continued in their agitation for a greater control of the oil revenue (Owabukeruyele, 2000).’
While the ruling class faction of the oil producing areas are determined in their struggle to change the already existing status quo of allocation of revenue which is not in their favour and interest, the other members of the domestic ruling class mainly of the non-oil producing nationalities are determined to maintain the status quo which had given them access to the resources they do not produce. This contradictory interests held by both factions of the Nigerian ruling class in the oil industry, therefore, is the major sources of conflict in the Niger Delta region. In this struggle, the faction of the ruling class on the oil producing enclave have mobilized their people to fight and achieve their aim.
That the conflict reflects the character of thy intra-class struggle among the dominant bourgeoisie class in Nigeria could be understood by the nature of the demands of the oil producing communities. They demand for those issues that are in the interest of the faction of the ruling class in the oil bearing enclaves and not in the interest of the peasant fanners who bear the greatest brunt of the environmental degradation from oil exploration. For example, they are demanding for” … greater representation in the Federal institutions, improved revenue allocation, job opportunities, political autonomy etc (Ogoni, 1991: 1O11). Most of these demands do not have direct bearing with environmental protection necessary for the fanning activities of the peasant farmers but rather reflect the aspiration of the faction of the ruling class (like, 2004).
Also, the rampant incidence of mis-appropriation that has characterized the various compensation programmes meant to cushion the impact of the environmental degradation by the members of the faction of the ruling class. Also, the Federal government has equally adopted palliative approach by extending a tokenist gesture to the faction of the bourgeoisie class and communities in the oil producing areas through the creation of institutional structures to ameliorate the effects of oil production in these areas. Hence, in 1992, a presidential task force for the development of the oil producing areas was established under the “Allocation of Revenue” (Federal Account, etc) Act of Parliament. This law provided that 1,5% of the Federal account be set aside and administered by the Federal government for the development of the oil mineral areas of the country. In 1992, following a renewed spate of agitation in the oil producing communities, the Babangida administration promulgated Decree I}O 23 of 1992 which provided among other things, the establishment of the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), a full time body to address the problems of Nigeria’s oil producing communities. The allocation from the Federal account was doubled from 1.5% to 3 percent. Finally, the present administration has also created the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to replace OMPADEC. But all these institutional mechanisms have been severely criticized because they have been ridden by high level corruption and ineffectiveness.
Apart from these tactics, the state has also used the instrument of divide and rule by manipulating communities or groups against the others.1 This is essentially to break their unity and ensure that they do not present a common front in their agitation. This was especially used at the peak of the Ogoni – land crisis. But the Nigerian state has not in spite of all these instrumentalities achieved the desired success. Therefore, the Niger Delta crisis has continued like a festering wound.
Conclusion
We began this study with the observation that environmental degradation constitutes one of the greatest problems facing mankind in the contemporary world. We noted that scholars have widely expressed the view that poverty forms the principal basis for the rampant incidence of environmental degradation in the third world states. We equally recognized that the environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, is at variance with this conventional wisdom. In other words, an empirical study of environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region not only provides sharp contradiction to this dominant view on poverty – environmental degradation relationship, but also shows that the worst forms of environmental degradation are not perpetrated by the poor, but the consequence of monopoly capitalism in tacit collusion with the state, Thus, years of massive impoverishment of the people of Niger Delta region in colonial and post-colonial periods through the operations of the multinational oil companies in alliance with the Nigerian state not only exacerbated the economic plight of the rural poor but also, created such antagonistic social relations of production and distribution that could not be contained except through violent clash with the Nigerian state. Against this background, the work examined the roles of monopoly capitalism and a peripheral capitalist type of Nigerian state in the destruction and despoliation of the material basis of the Niger Delta people, thereby, generating one of the most violent crisis in Nigeria since the civil war of 1967 – 1970.We also argued that the persistent nature of the Niger Delta crisis is mainly due to lack of consensus among the dominant bourgeoisie class in Nigeria on the fundamental issues of our political existence which have given rise to intense intra-class struggle. Ordinarily, the expectation should be that the Nigerian state through the Federal government should be able to mediate these opposing interests in the crisis. But the involvement of the Nigerian state in the Niger Delta crisis shows a gross manifestation of the factional interests which it promotes and protects. However, we are of the view that these measures are incapable of permanently resolving the crisis. We advocate for a participatory approach to the resolution of the crisis. This will involve the convening of a sovereign national conference where all the stake holders will sincerely express their views especially, on the issue of resource control and other wider national questions in , Nigeria. This has become crucial as a result of the ineffectiveness and biasness of the Nigerian state in resolving the conflict and other burning national issues.
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