Ilufoye Sarafa Ogundiya
Political Science Department
Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto.
Abstract
The study examines the crisis of legitimacy in the governance of Nigeria. In fact, the problem of regime legitimation remains a central element in the Nigerian crisis and leads to instability, this problem stemmed from the nature of the authority of the Nigerian state, its composition, poor performance capacity and the way it act as the locus classicus’ of decision making. Therefore, the political leaders of Nigeria, both military and civilian have faced numerous dilemmas in trying to secure acceptance and political allegiance from the entire citizenry. Because of the deficit of a strong sense of loyalty to the state and political leadership, national and societal cohesion successive regimes have to deal with such problems as the redefinition of the social and political order. Today, it is a herculean task to convince an average Nigerian that the state or political leadership deserved obedience, trust and confidence because of the extremely high level of apathy and political cynicism.
Introduction
The major problems dominating the Nigerian political landscape are that of how to find a non-coercive basis for securing and maintaining the loyalty of the citizens to the authority of the state. How do they construct governmental systems that will satisfy the desire of the states constituent and fragmented ethnic groups to have some measure of authority or control over their own destinies and well being and at the same time meet the desire for stability and unity? What socio-economic policies or programmes could be implemented to ensure a considerable level of support desired for stability and as well generate high level of political trust from the entire citizenry? In essence, the difficulty had been to find the right institutional framework built around a strong and committed head of state endowed with executive authority and enjoying a cross-national and trans-ethnic loyalty as well as indivisible support from the various groups that constitutes the Nigerian polity. It is the aim of this paper to provide the multi various explanations for the crisis of political legitimacy in Nigeria, discuss the experience of Obasanjo democratic regime and proffer possible solutions. However for the sake of expositional clarity a brief note on terminology precedes the work.
LEGITIMACY
The typical scholarly approach to the study of legitimacy begins with a search for operational definitions, which invariably ends up with something, that is either too simplistic or too complex. This is so because the concept of legitimacy has raised a number of fundamental questions for which satisfactory answers are still being sought (Gugliemo Ferrero quoted in Schutz 1995).
a) How can legitimacy be distinguished from such related concepts as compliance, allegiance and support?
b) How may legitimacy be measured and subjected to comparative treatment?
c) To what institutions and actors does the concept of legitimacy apply and,
d) What donors are legitimacy being solicited?
However, the concept of legitimacy grew out of the attempt to specify the sources of power, nature and consequences of men’s attitude towards their rulers and political institutions. And because power is so problematic societies will seek to subject it to justifiable rules, and the powerful themselves will seek to secure consent to their power from at least the most important among their subordinates (Beetham 1992:3-5). Therefore when power is acquired and exercised according to justifiable rules, and with evidence of consent, we call it rightful or legitimate.
According to Weber (quoted in Beetham 1992:6) legitimacy describes both a state of affairs and a process. It could have various sources or bases e.g. tradition, charisma, and legal rationality. However recent discussions and analysis on the notion of legitimacy have gone beyond the division of the sources of legitimacy into three (see Horowitz 1982: 158-183, Denitch 1977). Rather than see legitimacy from Weberian typologies, modern discussions have tended to see regime legitimating in terms of the two dominant ideologies of liberal democracy and social or communist ethos. Seymour Martin Lipset (1983) for instance places his concept of legitimacy into the board context of social conflict and democracy. He acknowledges that the term legitimacy contains value elements, namely values carried and applied by specific political social groups. This group approach to legitimacy, at least in an abstract perspective, according to Peter C. Ludz (1979: 176) makes it possible that legitimacy be used as a concept not only in research on differing social groups, but that it can only be applied to various forms of political organisations, including communist and fascist organisations (Ludz 1979: 176).
Ultimately, legitimacy involves explicit or implicit justifications for the authority of an order on the one hand and the development of a concomitant sense of obligations on the part of subjects or citizens on the other, and on a more pragmatic level, it involves the generation of expectations relating to the performance of official order and of varying degrees associated with their fulfillment (Fredrichs 1980:25). Therefore legitimacy like a tripod rests on three main legs (Beetham 1992:233-234). The first is “the acknowledged source of authority underpinning the rules of appointment to the leading offices of state”. The second is the capacity of its institutions to facilitate achievements of the ends or purposes of government while the third lies in the regular expression of consent.
This suggests that a procedural, traditional, charismatic or legalistically legitimate regime may suffer extinction or delegitimation if it fails to strive to sustain and maintain its legitimacy. In one word legitimacy must be strived for, earned and preserved or maintained.
Perhaps this explains why people often feel that a government or any of its institutions is just or unjust, legitimate or illegitimate, not only by how it came to power but also and mainly by what it does. This is where Lipset’s conception of legitimacy becomes more relevant to this work i.e. the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political order is the most appropriate ones for society. The capacity to engender the belief relies on the conformity to the mode of power acquisition by the incumbent with the society’s perception of what these beliefs are, while the capacity to sustain such power depends on or is determined by the ability of the incumbent to attain goals for the society.
The major difficulty with regard to analyzing the nature of legitimacy stems from the problem of boundary delineation (Zariski 1986:28). Voluntary compliance with a regime’s commands has been considered to be one of the hallmarks of legitimacy. Yet, it is clear that if a policy directive is advantageous to one’s interest-voluntary compliance may take place even though one regards the regime that has issued the directive as illegitimate. Therefore, legitimacy has to be distinguished somewhat from compliance, however voluntary (Eckstein 1971 :50-65, Gurr and Murriel 1977:30-33).
Rabuskha and Shepsle (cited in Osaghae 1995) provided expectations about outcome explanations and according to them:
Individuals remain loyal to a regime as long as they expect the regime to implement some of their preferences in the future, despite their unhappiness with current policy outcomes.
The even more difficult task of distinguishing legitimacy from support is clearly recognized by David Easton (1964:436-437, 450-451); who sees legitimacy as an expression, not of specific support (i.e. support for incumbents, policies and performance), but of diffuse support (i.e. support for the communityor regime). The person who gives diffused support to a regime characterized that regime as conforming to his/her own sense of what is morally appropriate. Therefore legitimacy is a question of morality and a question of political affection.
Above all, like the concepts of power and authority, legitimacy expresses a relationship between the leaders and the non-leaders. The leaders seek to- make their rule legitimate by justifying their right to rule. If the non-leaders accept these justifications as morally right and proper, then rule has become legitimate (Fredrichs 1980:314).
For our purpose legitimacy shall generally mean the right to be or to act, or the moral right of government to be obeyed. Therefore for analytical simplicity, we have operationalized legitimacy in a broad term to mean popular belief in or acceptance of an authority’s right to rule. In the case of Nigeria where elective principle has ceased to automatically confer legitimacy to civilian regimes; such right to rule can arise from the popularity of the programmes of the regime. Then, when legitimacy in crisis or better is put, when social scientist claim that legitimacy is in crisis. Legitimacy Crisis: A Conceptual Framework
Legitimacy crisis is the erosion of legitimacy (Reason cited in Friedrich 1980). The crisis of political legitimacy is perceived to exist on the basis of (at least in Western democracies) polls of public attitudes reflecting a precipitous decline in confidence in societal leadership, increasing manifestations of illegal, anti-social and repressive behaviour of policies and the demonstrable structural failures of the state to respond to fundamental human needs (Friedrich 1980). To Friedrichs (Ibid) there are three basis for claiming the existence of legitimacy crisis – First, that legitimacy crisis exist when there is a massive shift of attitudes towards major national institutions, characterized by dissipation of confidence and the emergence of public cynicism, including a perception of corruption and selfishness among the leadership. The second basis complements the first one and is behavioural on the one hand the behaviour of citizens, and on the other hand the behaviour of leadership. By behaviour of citizens Fredrich refers to such “activities as riots, violent demonstrations, protest, apathy, rebellion and the likes”, which may be taken as both symptom and consequences of legitimacy crisis. And by behaviour of leadership he refers “to the equally well-established policies of repression and disaffiliation, partly an expression of a concomitant loss of faith in its own legitimacy by the ruling elite” (Ibid). The third basis for the claim of legitimacy crisis according to Frecierich focuses “upon structural characteristics broadly conceived of the state and society which tends to deemphasize public perception”. In this regard the crisis is seen principally in terms of the inherent illegitimacy of the state. Thus, a legitimacy crisis-may be seen as having a perceptual dimension a behavioural dimension and a structural dimension.
Lucian Pye (1971: 135: 150) and Martin Lipset (1985 :65) conceived of legitimacy crisis as a crisis of transition. Perhaps transition from traditionality to modernity. For instance, legitimacy crisis according to Lipset (Ibid) usually occurs when a political system no longer has the capacity to provide adequate access to the political process for new social groups arising from below. In other words transition usually involves the entry of new social groups and the displacement of hitherto powerful groups. The entry of new groups expectedly, creates new expectations which, if not quickly, responded to could complicate the legitimacy crisis. Lipset opined.
After a new social structure is established, if the new system is unable to sustain the expectations of major groups (on the ground of effectiveness) for a long enough period to develop legitimacy upon the new basis, a new crisis may develop.
The theory has been found wanting and inadequate to account for the legitimacy deficit in Africa on grounds that the legitimacy crisis in Africa is not transitional ones. For instance Osaghae (1994:5) argued,
The legitimacy crisis in Africa is not, however, a transitional crisis per se. Although some dimensions of the crisis have been more pronounced during periods of transition, the peculiar feature of the legitimacy crisis in Africa … is its endemic character. The root of legitimacy in Africa lies in the fact that legitimacy was not vigorously pursued as part of statehood under colonial rule.
In another argument Bensman Joseph (1988: 15-35) noted that the complexities of the modern day government coupled with the demand overload could generate legitimacy crisis. He stated,
Modern society is characterized by rising expectations and increasing demands, for responsible leadership, which in turn provide the basis for modern form of legitimacy. Yet leaders constrained by structural problems of jurisdiction, technical expertise and planning fail to solve the basic claims of the populace. Unable to admit ‘structural competence; but faced with insoluble problems, they develop techniques of political deception that produced popular confidence. None of these techniques fully work. The result, the crisis of legitimacy is thus a natural consequence?
However, recent studies (see Rabuskha and Shepsle 1972, Bayo Adekanye & Onyeoziri, 1991) have shown that the effectiveness of government is a necessary but not sufficient condition for legitimacy to exist because it is not impossible for ineffective government to enjoy the support of the people.
Furthermore, the elite theorists present a crucial factor in the understanding of the legitimacy crisis. They reason that legitimacy crisis is the crisis of the elite. For when power is exercised and appreciates in value it transform itself to authority. But when power is exercised by excluding more and more of the elite, those who are entitled to the possibility of rulership, power depreciates in value and degenerates into violence and is ultimately transformed into terror. The circulation of power, which is built on the possibility of reversibility of power, disappears from the political agenda. Succession rules, which flow from ordered legitimacy and authority, become anathema (see generally Ekeh 1985).
This assertion was broadened into a thesis by Lowel Field and John Highley (1979: 141-159) thus: “where elites shared a consensus as a ultimate political values and where they were unified in their willingness not to pursue partisan interest beyond the point at which the stability of institutions are endangered, regimes enjoyed substantial legitimacy”. They further hypothesized that, “where, as in the majority of societies elite viewed power as personalized and directly dependent on the support of organized coercive forces, regimes had little legitimacy”.
In a related manner Rothchild (1979) maintained that the discussion of legitimacy and legitimation risks irrelevance if they overlook this crucial dimension of the public’s or the masses perception of that elite’s legitimacy.
Underlying this association of legitimacy with elite consensus and unity is the idea that the operation of all relatively stable, peaceful and legitimate regimes is in fundamental respects of a holding, steadying, and adjustive process. It is worth noting, however, that elite crisis is not synonymous with legitimacy crisis, albeit elite crisis can degenerate into legitimacy crisis. Perhaps this can occur when the disgruntled elite attracts the sympathy of the majority of the governed. However, the major catastrophe, which portends ill for Nigeria has been the oscillation rather than circulation of its elite. Since independence political offices have been oscillating between and among the same set of ‘militocivilian’ and bureaucratic elite. Historical and empirical evidence confirms this. The consequence for state legitimacy is that the average Nigerian finds it difficult to repose confidence in the same set of political office holders who have failed more than once and who remain unrepentant in their extravagant and reckless behaviour.
Scholarly attention also focused on the threat posed by ethnicity or ethnic pluralism to legitimacy. Scholars who uphold this view stressed that ethnic nationalism challenges the legitimacy of both ‘old’ and ‘new’ states. This argument is somehow tenable in Nigeria, as majority of Nigerians would prefer to be ruled poorly by their ethnic brethren rather than well by other ethnic group. But it is germane to note here that ethnicity may, not be an important explanatory variable as it has been taken to be in the literatures. More crucial is the performance capability of the state in the social, economic and political spheres.
The failure of the state to meet the yearning and expectations of the masses, as we shall see in the next section, has been more responsible for the crisis of confidence that bedevils the Nigerian state and its institutions.
To conclude this aspect it is necessary to state that the subject of legitimacy has received quite interesting and extensive attentions from the theorist of the state. But how is legitimacy crisis perceived or explained in Nigeria?
How is Legitimacy Crisis Explained in Nigeria?
Perhaps the starting point of this section, at least, for proper understanding of the legitimacy crisis as explicated in the literatures is to examine the problems confronting the Nigerian state, as identified by Olorunsola (1977:32-33) some two decades ago. ‘We shall outline the problems briefly because they are crucial for the understanding and analysis of the dynamics of the Nigerian political process.
(1) The problem of differing political culture among the various ethnic groupings in the country as well as the inability of those in authority to reconcile differing norms with another;
(2) The problems of differing impact of colonialism which manifests itself in uneven educational opportunities which in turn results in sharp differences in the rate of growth among various parts of the country and the alteration/disruption in the social stratification of the pre-colonial societies;
(3) The problem of ethnic based political patties which, for the selfish interest of maintaining themselves in power, accentuate sectional feelings and intensify primordial attachments;
(4) The loss of idealism, the reckless pursuit of wealth by the fortunate few, and the widening of the gap between the haves and the have nots;
(5) A sense of frustration by citizens regarding their future and fortune in the political order (the issue of rigged elections and the absence of freedom to pursue economic activity anywhere in the federation);
(6) The politics of cultural sub-nationalism and the politics of regional security;
(7) The apparent unwillingness to attack Nigerian problems at their foundation (i.e. preference for patch work has led the country to develop a vicious circle of crisis; and
(8) The problem of making national institutions behaves in truly national fashion.
Most of these factors have been employed by the students of Nigeria government and politics to explain the public loss of faith in government, mistrust of political leaders, and political instability and so forth between the middle and latter part of 1960 and even till the present day. We shall argue that, though some of these explanations are tenable, they are inadequate. They are inadequate because they fail to address what is actually fundamental. They are tenable because legitimacy is a complex and multi-dimensional concept. Importantly
number of factors could singly or conjointly plainly explains a political phenomena in Nigeria. Now let us examine some of these factors to be able to determine their strengths and weaknesses.
The theorist of the colonial conquest for example, stressed that the crisis of legitimacy formed part of the legacy bequeathed to African countries (Nigeria inclusive) by the colonial masters. For instance Osaghae (1988:293) argued; the colonial state being essentially a law and order state as was consistent with the colonial enterprise was built on the monopoly of the instrument but not the legitimate use of force and violence.
However, while some authors paid considerable attention to the subversion of traditional authority and the distortion of African values by the colonial policies and its attendant consequences, others stressed the effect of militant nationalism and the struggle for self rule on the legitimacy of the post colonial state. P.P. Ekeh (1985:91-112) argued,
The struggle entailed a necessary but destructive strategy, sabotage of the administrative efforts of the colonizers. A great deal of the anti-colonial activities by African bourgeoisie consisted of encouragement to their followers to be late to work, to go on strikes for a variety of reasons. He continued,
The African who evaded his tax was a hero; the African labourer who beat up his white employer was given extensive coverage in the newspaper. In general, the African bourgeois class in and out of politics encouraged the common man to shirk his duties to the government. .. in the same breath he was encouraged to demand his rights.
Such a strategy, Ekeh (Ibid) concluded, “was a necessary sabotage against alien personnel whom the African bourgeois class wanted to replace. By the time independence was achieved, this conception of the state as one to be exploited to further partisan interest had become so firmly established that the leaders themselves found it difficult to convince citizens that the state was deserving of obedience”. It is probably difficult to dispute Adigun Agbaje’s contention that violent ethno-religious confrontation, a major feature of the post-colonial states have created a credibility crisis for the government whose primary duty is to ensure safety of life and property (Agbaje 1990). He observed that post-colonial Nigeria has been,
a country that is neither dominantly Muslim nor Christian, but one that contains elements of both in rough parity-this had provided a potentially explosive background for disputes on the nature of the Nigerian states, the explosion of which breeds frequent religions disturbances and erosion of legitimacy on the part of the ruling government.
Though these arguments are tenable, one cannot suppose or suggest that colonial experience wholly explains the crisis of political legitimacy in Nigeria. On what account was independence won? The nationalist who wrestled power from the colonial masters promised the masses, among other things, to liberate them from the morass of economic and political stagnation, indecency, exploitation and poverty. They proved incapable of fulfilling this promises and it did not take too long for people to recognize that personality cults were the ends of leadership. The essence of the state was neglected in favour of personal aggrandizement. . Gradually, disenchantment and frustration set in. And this marked the erosion of the legitimacy of the first civilian government which culminated in the military coup of January 15, 1966. The military took over but the problem of moral credibility remains. As argued elsewhere the time has come to de-emphasize the theory of colonial conquest as an explanation [or the misfortune of Nigeria, but rather examine how the Nigerian political elites have worked to undermine their own legitimacy (Ogundiya 2001:248).
The incessant military incursion into politics worsened the situation. Indeed, when we turn from the state and its structures to look at the peoples over whom state power exercised, we find the worst face of the “Nigerian1 predicament: The mass of the people are ignorant, hungry, homeless, malnourished and unhealthy, and barely manage to eke out a living (Osaghae 1988:38). Side by side with this mass squalor we find droplets of affluence of a few who are either major operators of the state apparatus, or clients of patrons in government.
In Nigeria, competition to control of state power is as much a source as it is a consequence of the failure of legitimate government. More importantly, the possession of political power is a guarantee to economic power. Therefore the shortest cut to affluence and influence is through politics. Politics means money and money means politics (Dudley: 1965:21-24). This explains the problem of disorderly succession to power, which is at the heart of the legitimacy crisis, as well as the retention of the forceful and violent character of the colonial state (for a proper documentation of the crisis of succession see for instance Adamolekun 1995, Anifowose 1985, Ojigbo 1983, Ogunsanwo and Haroun 1982, Tamuno 1981). No wonder, Osaghae (1988:38) concluded – “Legitimacy, let it be said, is not a moral issue in Africa, it is a matter of translating power (better through the machine guns) into right”.
The unholy trinity of her three major ethnic groups on the one hand and the minority agitation on the other, some scholars argued, had rendered the Nigerian state somehow ungovernable, a potential source of instability. The composition of the Nigerian state and cut-throat rivalries amongst its major ethnic group for resources had generated poor affection from other ethnic groups that is not occupying the center of power. Now, no Nigerian thinks about how to bake the national cake again but rather how to share it. Perhaps this is why an average Nigerians, even the informed would prefer to be ruled poorly by their ethnic brethren rather than well by member(s) of other ethnic group. This is so because the state in Nigerian is not autonomous of the ruling class.
Broadly, two approaches can be distinguished in the study of ethnic conflict as it relates to legitimacy. The first holds that ethnicity is politicized by exploited social groups, which rally to ethnic symbols in what is essentially an economic conflict. Ethnic conflict may thus be seen as a form of class conflict. The second approach agrees that socio-economic inequality between ethnic groups plays a preponderant role in defining ethnic nationalism, but insists that culture must also be seen as an independent variable at least in so far as the nature of ethnicity itself may lead to inequality and hence to conflict/legitimacy crisis is a multi-ethnic state. What is common to the two approaches is the emphasis placed on relative deprivation as the basis for legitimacy crisis in a multi-ethnic state. Andreas Svrakov opined (1979:218)
For in a multi-ethnic state, the center will often be occupied by and identified with one ethnic group, relegating other groups to peripheral positions. Such peripheral positions with regard to political power often coincide with and reinforce peripheral economic, social and geographical positions.
Obviously, a system which is perceived to lead to the peripheralization of various ethnic groups cannot be seen as being effective and is less likely to be granted legitimacy by these groups (see also Gavin Williams 1980:70).
Furthermore, a crucial factor in the understanding of legitimacy crisis in Nigeria is that it goes beyond the plurality of the society to include policy failures and the inability of the state to meet the challenges of development. No wonder Alemika (1998: 18) sees the crisis as a reflection of the economic recession which engulfed the country since 1980s. According to him
The nations economic crises precipitated recession of political legitimacy and crisis of governance, which assisted and remained intractable under Shagari, Babangida, Shonekan, Abac ha, Abdulsalam (and even the current Obasanjo administration) since 1981. addition mine.
More so, the Nigerian state, both under the military and democratic regimes could be said to be guilty of negligence. The state has neglected or rather failed in its role to provide the proverbial common good. The problem of legitimacy is pronounced and compounded when the state or the incumbent failed to realize the basic essence of the state i.e. the pursuit of the common good, the protection of lives and property and the maximization of the citizenry’s quest for self-actualization. This is further compounded by high level of corruption, mismanagement, indecency and recklessness on the part of the operators of the state apparatus.
Unfortunately governments have proved mostly incapable of liberating the people from their sufferings. The inability of governments to make good their promises has not only led to greater frustration but also, to an erosion of the credibility of government and this, in turn further compounds the legitimacy crisis. In this calamitous situation, the individual withdraws and then transfers his/her loyalty or allegiance to his or her ethnic group where he/she could enjoy considerable level of sympathy.
Without doubt, therefore, the crisis of legitimacy in Nigeria is a crisis of morality, a crisis of decency, honour and accountability and, indeed, a crisis of performance. The crisis is enduring and persistent. Thus various regimes (both military and civilian) have sought legitimacy through series of mechanisms. This shall be discussed presently.
Legitimacy Engineering In Nigeria
Nigeria is not short of strategies, mechanisms, policies and programmes for short-circuiting the crisis of legitimacy. Because of its endemic, persistent, peculiar and multi-dimensional character, the way and manner with which individual regimes respond to the crisis differs. However, the only observable and visible non-coercive source of legitimacy engineering since independence in 1960 had been the promotion of ‘popular’ policies, both at the domestic and external levels; explicit mobilization programmes, constitutional engineering, condemnation of the past, and in-altruistic politics (which is usually counter productive) to mention a few.
This is so because; elections have failed to automatically confer legitimacy on any government in Nigeria. It could be said, without fear of contradiction, that procedural legitimacy right from independence, has been a scarce political commodity as election results are either juggled, rigged inflated or annulled.
Most of the popular programmes designed to terminate the crisis of political support, which space could not permit us to discuss into detail here are, the introduction of Unity Schools, the National Youth Service Scheme, the Operation Feed the Nation of the first Obasanjo regime, Babangida’s Mass Mobilization for Social and Economic Recovery, Vision 2010 and other constitutional innovations such as Federal Character Principle. What is worthy of note is that some of these programmes were designed to generate high level of affection and ward off the bitterness of the citizens against the state.
Perhaps the greatest flaw in these strategies is their top-down approach. All the initiatives have been taken by the federal government; while the state and local governments were reduced to mere implementing authorities. Another reason is corruption and mismanagement of funds earmarked for these programmes. Apart from the lack of clarity of goals, the indiscriminate proliferation and duplication of these programmes worsened the situation. Between 1986-1993 for instance over ten federal agencies were established. About five, Directorate of Food, Road and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI), NationalAgricultural Land Development Authority (NALDA), River Basin Development Authority (RBDA); Agricultural Development Project (ADP) and Strategic Grain Reserve Programme (SGRP) were supposed to be dealing with food and agricultural production while four National Directorate of Employment (NDE), Mass Mobilization for Social and Economic Recovery (MAMSER), Community Action Programme for Poverty Alleviation (CAPPA) and Family Economic Advance Programme (FEAP) among others, dealt with mobilization, participation, employment and skills improvement. All their objectives ‘were laudable. Those who captured the benefits from these various programmes were not the poor, but the rich and the powerful (the political class). This, not surprising, brought frustration, disillusionment and discouragement to the poor and inevitably, discontent and resentment. Most of these programmes failed because they are designed at a level removed from the people who also have very little hands in their implementation, the masses perceived, albeit rightly, the initiatives as being political motivated, intended more to buy legitimacy than to assist in alleviating their sufferings.
Coping with the Storm: Obasanjo Administration And The Question Of Legitimacy (1999-2003)
In 1976 Margaret Peil (14-20) findings revealed that Nigerians preferred to live under the canopy of a civilian democratically elected government rather than under the roof of the military. Since then Peil’s observation have been vindicated by Osaghae (1995). Roberts (1998:43-59) and Lewis and Bratton (2000). This suggests that the legitimacy rating of civilian rule is much higher when compared with military (Robert 1998:43-59). Though democracy provides the basic ingredients for a legitimacy to exist. Indeed, it is better to look beyond the citizens’ preference for regime type as a basis for political support and confidence. Procedural fairness, nature of party politics, societal cohesion, the performance capacity of the state and its ability to ameliorate the suffering of the citizens, security to lives and property (under the incumbent) and host of other factors affects, in the fundamental way, the attitudes of the masses toward the state and the incumbent. And since legitimacy is a moral and psychological issue, that is, a matter of affection, the state of affairs in respect of the aforementioned cannot be undermined. But what has been the experience of Obasanjo administration since inception in 1999.
Like Shehu Shagari civilian administration (1979-83), the Obasanjo democratic regime inherited legitimacy crisis of a considerable magnitude. Donald Rothchild (1995:53) argument is instructive here – “that any civilian government elected to power after a decade of military governance would lack deep roots in society.” Thus the lack of democracy in Nigeria since 1983 and the absence of democratically determined processes of development have widened the legitimacy gap. The economic liberalisation and political transitions, which were stalled in 1992 created crises of unmanageable proportion.
Therefore, legitimacy crisis is one of the unpalatable legacies, which the military bequeathed to the present civilian administration. For a period of fifteen years (1983-98) Nigeria and indeed Nigerians suffered under the autocratic, dictatorial and phlegmatic military rulership. During this time, mayhem, vendetta, deception and political assassinations were the norms of the day. Expectedly, an average Nigerians have developed a negative attitude towards the state. Indeed, the military had being a major source of instability in Nigeria’s political development and had frustrated the emergence of a mature political culture. Rotimi Suberu (1987: 1180) forcefully argued,
A fundamental feature of the contemporary Nigerian psyche is the deep and profound distrust for government. The dream of responsive and popular government in Nigeria has collapsed in the face of repeated abortion and frustration of popular aspirations by consecutive Nigerian governments, very few Nigerians believe that government can act for the public good.
What factors account for the persistence of the crisis and how far has the present Obasanjo democratic regime gone to arrest the crisis. There is little doubt that the present civilian administration is still far from putting the crisis of legitimacy at bay, because a lot of factors that precipitated legitimacy crisis in the pre-Obasanjo era persist. The political space has not provided maximum or equal opportunities for the citizens to fulfill their aspirations; threat to lives and property; social, economic and political insecurity; frequent industrial disputes showing workers bitterness against state labour policies; incessant ethno-religious conflicts; political bickering; pandemic corruption and reckless display of wealth by the political office holders and the pauperization of the masses; poverty and political apathy arising from the belief that the state does not exist for the common man; and the recycling nature of the corrupt, ineptitude and unrepentant Nigerian political elite among others.
Few examples will suffice. Obasanjo administration came with a vociferous campaign against corruption. The president in his maiden speech to the nation owed that there would be no sacred cows. He retired all the former military governors and political appointees who were deemed to be corrupt and promise to extend it to the civil service. The executive further sponsored and later signed Anti-corruption bill into law. The Anti-corruption Commission (ICPC) was also inaugurated to treat cases of corrupt practices. However, events thereafter made nonsense of the oft-repeated boast of president Obasanjo that there would be no sacred cows in his anti-corruption crusade.
The first speaker of the House of Representative Alhaji Salisu Buhari was the first victim. He was accused of forgery, an offence that lie1 later pleaded guilty. The role of the Executive in this celebrated case was suspicious. After some political manipulations, Salisu Buhari was not only slightly punished by the Court but was also ‘immediately’ granted a state pardon by the Executive, in
another drama, the Senate President, Chuba Okadigbo was impeached on account of embezzlement, inflation of contracts and mismanagement. He was neither prosecuted by any court of law nor even appeared before the Anti-corruption Commission. After the death of the latter, there were heaps of encomiums, magnification and praises, from the same set of politicians that accused him of corruption, for the life well spent incorruptible nature and his moral uprightness. Could it be true that his impeachment was absolutely politically motivated? Other issues which demonstrated the gross insincerity on the part of the Executive is, the appointment of the corrupt and discredited politicians into public office. Jibrin Ibrahim (2003:8) observed,
“The retention of numerous personalities reputed to be highly corrupt has indeed eroded the credibility of the Executive (and) its resolves to fight against corruption”.
Added to this is the attitude of the Executive to the allegation of corruption against his staff, political associates, and the legislative and judicial arms. One of such cases was summarised by Jibrin (2003:8-9) thus, “Even more disturbing is the attitude of the Executive in connection with the recent report of the Auditor-General of Federation to the National Assembly on 10 January 2003 alleging widespread financial irregularities, over-invoicing, scam and colossal waste of public resources revealed in the 2001 federation Accounts.
Rather than investigating the allegations, the Minister of Finance Mallam Adamu Ciroma dismissed the report as mere ‘audit queries’ while the Minister of Information “angrily declared that the report was “a play to embarrass government” (Jibrin 2003:9). As if these were not enough, President Obasanjo openly defended the position of his ministers on NTA monthly popular programme ‘Presidential charts’ of February 2003 castigating the Auditor General.
Issues like these have raised serious questions about the place of morality in the administration of the Nigerian state. And if legitimacy is defined as belief in the moral right of government to be obeyed, do an 1 Oral operators of the state that perceive it as one huge moneybag to be pillaged by all comers who are opportune to do so, have a moral right to demand obedience from the citizens?
Other factors that have worked to undermine the credibility of the present administration are the ‘ethnicization’ and over politicisation of issues among the elites. These have generated serious ethno-religious violence .and communal tussles throughout the country. Since inception, Obasanjo government have recorded over 30 major ethno-religious conflicts and communal clashes’ which have claimed hundreds of lives, and inestimable property destroyed (Alubo 2002).
The erosion of legitimacy as currently been experienced by Obasanjo administration is seen principally as arising from the ethnic game designed by the98disgruntled elite who feels cheated or sidelined in the present political arrangement to discredit and delegitimize Obasanjo administration.
To this school, the gradual erosion of the legitimacy of the present administration does not solely revolve around substance*. Often time, in politics, secondary issues are raised above primary one. In the North and East for instance, the political elite feels they have not been properly compensated after they had laboured assiduously to ensure Obasanjo’s victory at the poll. It was a general belief among the northerners, for instance, that it was the north that made Obasanjo the president. The expectations were that the political calculus would be tilted not only in favour of the North but also in favour of some personalities in that region. In fact, average ‘northerners’ are made to believe that Obasanjo’s policies are hostile towards the north. This is generally seen as a betrayal of trust after he had enjoyed overwhelmed support from the north and the east during the 1999 general elections for instance.
If this thinking is right, then the question of political legitimacy, as it is now, is not solely a question of performance but also product of the politics between and among the contending elites. As such, issues have been overpoliticised. More importantly Obasanjo is bent on taking unpopular economic and political decisions that hardly differentiate his government from the military one. The removal of subsidies on petroleum products, the detention of labour leaders and the move to demoralize and decentralize Nigeria Labour Congress, the invasion and destruction of Odi town are few examples. Equally important is .the fact that average Nigerians have not seen any meaningful improvement in his/her welfare since 1999. This brings us to an important question. What actually matters to Nigerians. Is it democracy, civil rule or otherwise? Indeed the only thing that will strengthen the support of an average Nigerian for the state or the incumbent leadership is his/her ability to realize his/her expectations and importantly his/her access and opportunity to good things of life.
N.A. Belko A colleague expressed this feeling during discussion with him on the question of legitimacy in Nigeria
CONCLUSION
We have argued in this paper that so many factors accounts for the crisis of political legitimacy in Nigeria. The preponderant factor is the inability of the state to provide the proverbial common good. This is defined in term of the performance capacity of the state. In short, the crisis of legitimacy in Nigeria is a crisis of policy failures and inability of state and its institutions to facilitate achievements of the ends or purposes of government.
The perception of corruption and selfishness among the political office holders has worsened the situation. This has further led to social exclusion and pauperization of the masses. Nigerians therefore demands more than electoral fairness but also responsive and humane government. In fact democracy is more than one-man-one-vote mechanism, respect for and recognition of basic human
Rights, social justice etc are some of the other key properties of truly committed and responsible governance. Poverty, unarguably breeds, enmity, dejection and violence. Obviously, a free tongue without a full stomach is weak, and political obligation or support in the absence of social, economic and political security is unreal. Fundamentally, a depoliticised poverty eradication programme devoid of rhetoric must be put in place. The political space must be de-ethnicised and there must be a massive national mobilization to establish a decent moral tone of government at all levels, with the purging of corruption in all aspects of national life. Finally it must be realized that the success of democracy lies in the performance of elected leaders without which no leader or state will enjoy massive support.
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