Okibe Hyginus Banko
Department of Political Science
Enugu State University of Science & Technology
ABSTRACT
This study focused on four contending perspectives to controvert the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) claim of integrity in its humanitarian intervention in Libya. The problem, therefore, is that NATO disguised her national interest in the humanitarian intervention in Libya, and violated both R2P and nonintervention principle in the UN Charter, Article 2(7). The objective of the study is to show that intervention is motivated by quest for hegemony and power in pursuit of state’s national interests that are espoused in foreign policy. The study dwelt on secondary data and used content analysis for data presentation and discussion. Theory of political realism was used to explain state’s behavior in international relations and how power rivalry dominates the process. The findings show that NATO’s intervention in Libya was to dethrone Gaddafi and not humanitarian. Violence and human rights abuse in post-Gaddafi Libya bears this evidence out. It identified lack of integrity in the intervention and recommended compliance with R2P norm without bias.
Keywords: Fallacy, NATO, Humanitarian Intervention, Regime Change and Libya
INTRODUCTION
The Libyan crisis broke out on February 15, 2011, after the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. The ensuing protest was violently repelled by the Libyan authority. Within the initial start of the crisis, Libyan forces had already killed eighty-four protesters (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Benghazi became the linchpin of the revolution. Massive killings and threats of civilians characterized government’s inability to halt the protest and stem the carnage. Sequel to failures of diplomatic truce, the doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) was invoked on Libya after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011, which “authorized member states to take all necessary measures, to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” (Blanchard, 2011:13). It was these protests that laid the groundwork for the rebel movement, aided by NATO, fighting Gaddafi forces (Foley, 2011).
Despite Article 2/7 on non-intervention in internal affairs and UNGA Res. 2131 on inviolability of state’s sovereignty, NATO’s intervention in Libya, (as was the case in Kosovo in 1999) challenged the intendment and relevance of the provisions in regulating state’s behavior. The argument is that intervention aims to avoid recurrence of situations where “interstate wars in the 20th Century involved the killing of around 140 million people of various states by nationals of other states”(Leitenburg, 2006:14); the same period governments killed an estimated 170 million of their own people” (Freeman, 1997). It therefore raises global concerns for humanitarian intervention, “given that assaults by governments upon their own people can be, and historically has been, ended by intervention” (Wheeler, 2002). The intervention involves “the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights” (Goodman, 2006:107).
It is argued that NATO intervention in Libya was subjective, geared towards achieving Western national interests and framed with ulterior motive of dethroning Gaddafi. There is also another view that the inability of African Union, the League of Arab States and the UN to genuinely broker peace in the crisis encouraged and sustained the rebel’s connivance with the West to declare war on Libya. These views are what this study attempts to establish their veracity based on the information it sourced. The first part is the general introduction. Part two discussed the objectives of study and statement of research problems. Part three dwelt on brief literature of the study, showing the lapse that necessitated this research. This is followed by the theoretical framework. Part four focused on the theoretical discourse, paying particular attention to the contending issues that underlie NATO intervention in Libya. The discourse buttresses the significance of political realism in the understanding of state’s behavior in relation to its foreign policy objectives and national interest. The last part summarized the research findings and made recommendations.
STATEMENTS OF PROBLEM
The Arab Spring created political crisis and flux of conflicting interests between the autocratic regimes and opposition elements. Apart from portending mass deaths, it also renders the state’s sovereignty vulnerable to wanton external interference. Though R2P imposes obligation on states and international community to avert imminent or likely mass deaths or impending war crimes, its implementation in Libyan crisis produced disturbing consequences – promotion of Western national interests in Libya, mass deaths, destructions of infrastructure and regime change. The crimes Gaddafi was alleged to be committing were not peculiar to Libya but common to Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, etc. While the international community feigns these crimes in most of the afore-mentioned countries, Libya was singled out for enforcement of humanitarian intervention. Hamilton and Solomon (2012) reported the bias, saying that “…the West and the Arabs quickly granted recognition to a Revolutionary National Council as the sole legitimate government of Libya. They did not do the same for the splintered SNC in Syria. There is also little chance they will agree to arm rebels”. This selective treatment poses a problem to R2P norm. In other words, NATO claims integrity in its military operations in Libya amidst doubts that it was humanitarian. It undermined human safety and protection of nonvolatile areas, and significantly violated the UN Charter, the sovereignty and political authority of Libya and exposed the rationale for R2P to ridicule. These issues will be carefully analyzed to establish the valid facts.
OBJECTIVES OF STUDY
The objectives of this study are three folds: (i) to find out whether the intervention in Libya was a selective or general case, (ii) to examine whether the intervention was humanitarian or for national interests, and (iii) whether NATO’s intervention was genuine or disguised for other motives. In the course of this investigation, the questions of whether force is synonymous with the doctrine of R2P and if Libyan crisis qualifies for military campaign that snowballed into regime change, leading to further human rights violations under the auspices of NATO, will surely suffice.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are two discernible schools of thought on the arguments for and against intervention. The first set, classified as realist school consists of classical and neo-classical realists. The realists; including Edward Carr (1939), Morgenthau (1967), Michael Walzer (1977), Mearsheimer (2001), Hilpod (2002), and Antonio (2005) etc., oppose intervention, arguing that it violates the Peace Treaty of Westphalia which upholds sovereignty and equality of states provided for in the UN Charter. They argue that the traits of human nature are selfish and interest driven in action. They explain international relations as a vicious cycle of wars between countries. They insist that international order is best maintained by respect for non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. In this vein, Abiew (1999) notes that, the UN Charter unambiguously provides for non-intervention which most interventions that hide under the cloak of humanitarian invocation breach. The second set is referred to as the Idealist school. By the “idealists” we have in mind writers such as Sir Alfred Zimmern, Woodrow Wilson, S.H. Bailey, Philip Noel-Baker, and David Mitrany. Others include James T. Shotwell, Pitman Potter, and Parker T. Moon (Donald Markwell. 2004). According to the idealists, war does not uphold international value system founded on moral principles, and the exercise of power should not be aimed at desecrating the sanctity of human values or in utter neglect or violation of the international laws. They look at the world as an ideal type, which state’s behaviour should promote, ensuring respect for human rights and conduct of governance to promote these ideals. They argue that where these ideals are being breached to provoke the conscience of humanity, the international body should intervene to restore order and human values, which is universally accepted as an approved standard of existence. Fermor (2011) explores the rational for intervention in the internal affairs of Libya in an Article entitled, “NATO’s Decision to Intervene in Libya (2011): Realist Principles or Humanitarian Norms”? According to him, “the international community, through the United Nations, has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”.
Although the Idealists give credence to humanitarian intervention, Abiew (1999) in an Article entitled “The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention” notes that, “there appears to exist a glaring disparity between the intendment of humanitarian intervention and the contemporary practice in intervention, which has subjected the principle itself to ridicule”. David Gibbs and Berube (2012) extrapolate the view, stressing that intervention is counter-productive, “…given the appalling history of interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the former Yugoslavia, and probably, in Libya as well”. According to them, “these interventions have absorbed vast amounts of resources that could have been better used, for more genuinely humanitarian purposes, while they have increased human suffering in the targeted countries (Gibbs and Berube, 2012). In the same vein, Garikai (2014) notes that, “in 2011, the West’s objective was clearly not to help the Libyan people, who already had the highest standard of living in Africa, but to oust Gaddafi, install a puppet regime, and gain control of Libya’s natural resources”. These tendencies buttress the arguments by Mareike(2012) that, under the United Nations Charter, humanitarian intervention to save the citizens of a state – is illegal unless this use of force has been authorized by the Security Council”. It is therefore evident that power rivalry and quest for economic control underlie state’s interests in external intervention. Nonetheless, what the preceding literatures did not discuss and which is the focus of this study is the claim by NATO that its intervention in Libya has integrity. This has not been argued logically to lay bare the fallacy and inconsistencies in the presumption that NATO’s intervention was appropriate and successful.
METHODOLOGY
The study is purely analytical and evaluative, and adopted content analysis method in data presentation, discussion and reporting of findings. The data are mainly from secondary source and focused on the issues listed for investigation. These include (i) Western interests to disband Libyan inflexible oil control, (ii) Feeble peace efforts to aggravate intervention, (iii) Obtrusive vendetta on Gaddafi for his wrongs against the West and humanitarian abuse and (iv) Abuse of R2P and violation of the UN Charter. The theoretical discourse made in-depth analysis of the research problems and provided the premise for testing of the research questions based on the available data.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Theory of political realism is actually apt for explanation of NATO’s intervention in the internal affairs of Libya. The theory originates through the works of Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli, emerging as an International Relations based approach in the inter-war years of the 20th century. Realism, “is a spectrum of ideas” which revolve around the four central propositions of Political Groupism, Egoism, International Anarchy and Power Politics (Goodin, 2010:132). The realists assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power. That assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman – past, present, or future – has taken or will take on the political scene (Donnelly, 2008:150). Politics is a struggle for power over men…the modes of acquiring, maintaining, and demonstrating it determines the technique of political action (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010:66). The use of power places an emphasis on coercive tactics to either accomplish something in the national interest or avoid something inimical to the national interest (Baylis, et al: 2008:95). From the political action and the reality of their motivations, the motives behind every action are clearly understood.
The Western foreign policy objectives in the Middle East and Africa center on their national interest. In consonance, their intervention in Libya, though disguised in humanitarian concerns, aimed to achieve three-pronged objectives – to control Libyan oil resources, to terminate Gaddafi’s rule and lastly, to institute democratic system in Libya. This will end Gaddafi’s incessant power contestation with the West, stop apprehension for his sponsorship of terrorist activities in the future, and foreclose resuscitation of his nuclear armament development programme for self-defense and oppression of Libyan citizens. This conforms to the realist’s belief that power is central to achieving national interest. From the perspective of political realism, therefore, there is nothing humanitarian in NATO’s intervention in Libya. It rather underscores the habit of Western leaders in presenting their foreign policies in terms of their philosophic and political sympathies in order to gain popular support for their actions. This notion of sympathy forms the cradle of support for humanitarian intervention as long as it is authorized by the UN Security Council; and multilaterally undertaken (Doyle and Recchia, 2011:1434). It must aim at stopping human rights violations or prevent acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay, 2008:3). Despite invoking humanitarian emotion to intervene in Libya, NATO’s complicity in aiding and abetting the rebel forces, the level of destruction caused by her bombing on civilian population and infrastructural facilities which climaxed with the gruesome murder of Gaddafi, bore witness to the objective of the intervention. The whole exercise was shrouded in battle for supremacy that NATO won, not in favour of Libyans but NATO member countries that have turned Libya into colonial estate and capitalist feeding bottle.
The theory of political realism provides good understanding of power and how it influences the behaviour of NATO states and her leaders, e.g. President Barak Obama (U.S), Nicolas Sarkozy (France) and David Cameroun (UK), in their interference in the internal affairs of states. The intervention conforms to the foreign policy objectives of the West to conquer Libya and affect its political and economic organization to their advantage. Success in intervention is defined as the degree to which one is able to maintain, to increase, or to demonstrate one’s power over other” (Bettina, 2008:6). The intervention serves as a manifest reality of power politics motivated by national interests and geared towards supplanting a weaker nation to entrench hegemonic control over her land and resources, in violation of the UN Charter.
THEORETICAL DISCOURSE
WESTERN INTERESTS TO DISBAND LIBYAN INFLEXIBLE OIL CONTROL
Libya the World’s largest oil economies with approximately 3.5% global oil reserves, more than twice those of the US (Chossudovsky, 2011). Foreign oil companies operating prior to the insurrection in Libya include France’s Total, Italy’s ENI, the China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), British Petroleum, the Spanish oil consortium Repsol, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Occidental Petroleum, Hess and Conoco Phillips (Ibid). In March 1970, the Libyan Government dissolved the Libyan Petroleum Company (Lipetco) and replaced it with the Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC). In July, the regime nationalized the networks for distributing oil products owned by foreign oil companies, and gave sole rights to the NOC to distribute such products throughout the country. Later in 1971, Libya nationalized the holdings of British Petroleum (BP) as a gesture in support of Islamic and pan-Arab power (Chossudovsky, 2011). In 1973, Libya announced the nationalization of oil major Hunt’s assets in the Sarir field in retaliation for US support of Israel. Later in the year, the regime issued a decree nationalizing US-owned Occidental, transferring 51% of all funds, rights, assets, shares and interests to the state (ElWarfally, 1988). Libya issued a 16-article law nationalizing 51% of the assets of all remaining oil companies operating in Libya in September of 1973, and in 1974 Gaddhafi further nationalized three US companies by seizing the remaining 49% share of California Asiatic Company, American Overseas Petroleum Company and the Libyan-American Oil Company (ElWarfally, 1988). By 1975, the assets of almost all companies working in Libya were either fully nationalized (such as BP) or majority owned by the Libyan State, who held a 63% of the assets of German Winterhall, 85% of Austrian OMV, 59.2% of the Oasis Group and 50% of the assets of Italian Agip. These moves were widely interpreted as Gaddhafi using oil resources as a political weapon (ElWarfally, 1988). Gaddafi maintained this uncompromising firmness in oil control throughout the embargo periods (1988-2003) and appeared more resolute and stronger from 2003 onwards when the embargo was finally lifted. The West has enormous investments in the Libyan oil sector. The Italian oil consortium, (ENI), puts out 244,000 barrels of gas and oil, which represents almost 25% of Libya’s total exports (Chossudovsky, 2011). It has a number of key energy assets in Libya, starting with the Greenstream pipeline in the west, which supplies Italy with around 15 percent of its natural gas imports. It also has stake in a number of lucrative oil-producing concessions, including the Bouri Oil field, the largest offshore field in the Mediterranean Sea, located immediately off the Coast of Tripoli, and the Wafa and Elephant oil fields in west and southwestern Libya, respectively. Libya accounts for some 15 percent of ENI’s total global hydrocarbons output, with oil production of 108,000 barrels per day and natural gas production of 8.1 billion cubic meters in 2009 (Chossudovsky, 2011).
China’s emergence in the Libyan oil industry proves Gaddafi’s open door policy and unsettled western monopoly. The China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) speedily began to posture as a potential rival to European interests in the region, with a workforce of some 400 employees in Libya’s oil sector. The total Chinese workforce in Libya was of the order of 30,000. Eleven percent of Libyan oil exports are channeled to China. Therefore, China’s presence in North Africa was considered by Washington to constitute an intrusion. From a geopolitical standpoint, China is an encroachment. The military campaign directed against Libya is intent upon excluding China from North Africa (Chossudovsky, 2011). Among US companies in Libya, Chevron and Occidental Petroleum (Oxy) decided in October 2010 not to renew their oil and gas exploration licenses in Libya but the gap was filled in November 2010; when Germany’s oil company RWE Dea signed a far reaching agreement with Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) involving exploration and production sharing (Johnson, Jr., 2011). The result was that at the time of the popular uprising against Gaddafi, there was considerable anxiety in oil circles about the possibility of generalized political breakdown and chaos, with attendant threats to oil supplies and involvements. Gibbs (2009) notes that, the oil companies seem to have welcomed the Western military intervention as a stabilizing factor for Libyan oil; and also as a show of force for the whole Arab world, to demonstrate that the Western powers still exert control. Accordingly, the Western corporations have long relied on military interventions by their home governments to protect or open up investment opportunities overseas, and it seems likely that Libya is the latest illustration of this basic corporate tendency” (Gibbs, 2009).
From the very start, coalition countries made it no secret that they were aiming at Libyan oil reserves and at establishing spheres of influence in the region, bypassing the UN. Libya is seen as a valuable trophy, and it is up to those who dropped bombs on it to distribute the trophies (Garibov. 2011). The “Operation Libya” is part of the broader military agenda in the Middle East and Central Asia which consists in gaining control and corporate ownership over more than 60% of the world’s reserves of oil and natural gas, including oil and gas pipeline routes (Chossudovsky, 2011). This explains why Italy and Germany vacillated over the proposed military attack on Libya, contrary to UK, U.S and France eagerness to invade Libya. For the US, “an invasion of Libya under a humanitarian mandate would serve the same corporate interests as the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. The underlying objective is to take possession of Libya’s oil reserves, destabilize the National Oil Corporation (NOC) and eventually privatize the country’s oil industry, namely transfer the control and ownership of Libya’s oil wealth into foreign hands” (Chossudovsky, 2011).
At the start, “some 80% Libya’s developed petroleum fields” fell in rebel-held territory, and the Benghazi leadership was making plans to pump the oil and receive the proceeds. The indication from the oil fields are that some oil workers are pumping the oil themselves as expatriate companies flee, and it is possible that the Benghazi leadership could export by tanker truck despite the closing of the Italian pipeline (Cole, 2011). Although Saudi Arabia was pumping extra petroleum (500,000 barrels a day), it is probably not actually replacing what has been lost from Libyan production. Brent crude hit $114 a barrel…the world is skating on the edge of petroleum prices so high that they could push the global economy back into recession (Cole, 2011). There were fears that Libyan crisis potentially threatened all of these, thus prompting direct military intervention disguised for humanitarian purposes but later unveiled why its selective application. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria were spared of intervention. Chomsky (2003) contends that, “during the Middle East uprising, the oppressed in these countries made efforts to try and join the Arab spring, but they were crushed, very harshly, with not a word from the Western powers. Sometimes it was quite violent, as in eastern Saudi Arabia and in Bahrain, which were Shiite areas, mostly, but it resulted in at most a tap on the wrist by the Western powers. They clearly wanted the oil dictatorships to remain. That’s the center of their power” (Chomsky, 2012).
Their sole concern is access, and “this is sustained by the Western collaborations with regimes that grant them unfettered access in their oil sector and bothers not, even when these autocratic regimes apply repressive policies or engage in blatant human rights violations (Chomsky, 2003). However, Gaddafi was not in this category due to his alleged uncompromising posture in acceding to western control of Libyan oil resources. The countries that are most significant to the United States and the West, generally, are the oil dictatorships and they remain very stable. This is further illustrated by the fact that the Obama administration continues the decades’ long close US relationship with the incredible repressive Saudi Royal family (Shalom, 2011). In Tunisia, which had mostly French influence, the French supported the dictatorship, Ben Ali until the very end. In fact, they were still supporting it after demonstrations were sweeping the country. In Egypt, where the United States and Britain were the main influences, it was the same. Obama supported the dictator, Mubarak until virtually the last minute – until the army turned against him. There is case after case like that, supporting the dictator to the very end, regardless of how vicious and bloody he is (Chomsky, 2012). Explaining the disparity in internal reactions, Ross (2011) states that, “the citizens of countries with little or no oil, such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia, generally had more freedom than those countries with lots of it, such as Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. And once the tumult started, the oil-rich regimes were more effective at fending off attempts to unseat them (Ross, 2011). When the same repressive resistance to protesters by Saudi Kings, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria incite no external interference, Ross (2011) concludes that “the Arab Spring has seriously threatened just one oil-funded ruler-Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi-and only because NATO’s intervention prevented the rebel’s certain defeat”.
These have been the long dream of the West, to edge out Gaddafi and seize Libyan oil. In other words, the primary goal of US in the area, therefore, is to exploit, and even more to control the dispersal of oil. This interest dates back to 1945 when the US State Department acknowledges that Middle East Oil was “a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history” (Chomsky, 2012). What is at stake is the redrawing of the map of Africa, a process of neo-colonial redivision, the scrapping of the demarcations of the 1884 Berlin Conference, the conquest of Africa by the United States in alliance with Britain, in a US-NATO led operations (Chossudovsky, 2011). This proves that the Libyan intervention appears as just another iteration in the familiar…idea of realpolitik, whereby western states pursue their narrow self interests, and then justify their actions through pompous rhetoric. And oil was a factor in the decision making process that led to intervention in this case (Gibbs, 2011).
FEEBLE PEACE EFFORTS TO AGGRAVATE INTERVENTION
The African Union, Arab League and the United Nations, did not pursue genuine resolution of Libyan crisis before the hasty intervention by the coalition forces led by NATO. The Libyan crisis involved the African Union in various ways. As a regional organization which Libya is a foremost member, it has the responsibility to regulate the activities of its member states, especially in crisis situations. The AU has the Peace and Security Council (PSC) which duty is to respond, in a timely manner, to imminent threats to peace and security in any member state through an array of preventive diplomacy mechanisms including the good offices of the Chairperson of the Commission, as well as mediation efforts by a Panel of the Wise and other eminent African personalities (Protocol on Peace and Security Council of the African Union). To enforce any prevention, management and resolution of conflicts; the rule of non-indifference, the responsibility to protect (R2P) and the notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’ become the guideposts. These rules are enshrined in major documents including the Constitutive Act of the AU (2000), the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU (2002), the Ezulweni Consensus on the reform of the UN (2005), the 2004 Common African Defence and Security Policy (2004), as well as the AU Non-Aggression Common Defence Pact (2005) -(Powell, 2005:20-21). In response to the brewing crisis in Libya, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, on the 23rd of February 2011, condemned the excessive use of force by the Libyan authorities against peaceful protesters in violation of the fundamental human rights and aspirations for a democratic government (Bellamy & Williams, 2011:839).
This was later followed by a meeting the AU held that involved almost all the key players and stakeholders in the crisis. The African Union Chief Jean Ping stated that the meeting was aimed at coining up with a roadmap to resolve the crisis, including the formation of a transitional government, the holding of elections and the building of democratic institutions to meet the aspirations of all Libyans (Omer, 2011). The meeting was attended by a wide range of interested parties, including the UK, France and other European countries that are part of the U.S. – dominated coalition carrying out air and naval strikes against Libyan government forces; the United Nations, which authorised a no-fly zone, an embargo and measures to protect civilians; Russia and China, which abstained from the vote on the U.N. resolution and have been critical of foreign military action thus far; and representatives of Libya’s neighbours, such as Algeria (Omer, 2011). Libyan leader Muommar Gaddafi sent a delegation led by Mohammad Al-Zawi, Speaker of the People’s Congress, but the rebel Transitional National Council, crucially, declined to attend the meeting, demanding that Gaddafi’s stepping down be placed on the agenda. Direct talks do not seem an immediate possibility (Omer, 2011). Notwithstanding, in mid-April, 2011, the Libyan leader met with delegates of the African Union and appeared to have accepted a roadmap to peace. However, the opposition rejected the deal, arguing that it was non-binding and did not address the issue of Qaddafi’s ouster. The NTC then toughened their conditions, clearly stating that there would be no ceasefire negotiation without the incorporation of a political process leading up to Qaddafi’s departure (Omer, 2011). All these drift point to sinister motives; the AU was not proactive in the first instance; the coalition forces were already raiding Libya when it convened the meetings. Despite that rebel Transitional National Council abstained from the meeting fully attended by the countries that intervened on its behalf, it was not condemned. Nothing was considered to be wrong about their rigid condition that collapsed the path of peace envisaged to blossom through discussion, negotiation and compromise. Rather, pro-Gaddafi forces were further emboldened by the reluctance to take enough assertive action to douse the rebel’s defiant posture, which compounded by the complacency of their accomplices (western coalition forces led by NATO).
Remarkably, in 2002, following the transformation of the OAU into the AU, the first Chairperson of the African Union Commission, President Alpha OumarKonare, called for the need to shift from a culture of non-intervention to a culture of non-indifference (Murithy, 2007). The codification of that norm came through the adoption of the AU Constitutive Act. In particular, article 4(h) affirms ‘the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.’ In the same vein, article 4(j) declares ‘the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.’ Finally, article 7(e), of the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council, states that the Council can ‘recommend to the Assembly (of Heads of State), intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments’ (Murithy, 2007). When it was glaring that Gaddafi was violating human rights and it was escalating daily to an astronomical proportion, the AU was vacillating and could not take decisive action to stem the killing spree and heightening threats for more dastard attacks. It shows lack of consensus among African Heads of states on collective intervention mechanism in Libya in compliance with their primary responsibility for conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa that lies with the AU. None of the laid down peace measures was substantially harnessed, instead, individual state’s enforcement action accentuated earlier suspicion that Gaddafi has “often championed the notion of a Pan-Africa and paid a large portion of the African Union’s funds, and hence the African Union may be unduly influenced by him” (Omer, 2011).
Although AU and African diplomacy generally continue to put a high premium on state sovereignty, there is a notable institutional shift in favour of a more qualified interpretation of the concept, which, together with the emphasis on human security, accommodates non-military and military intervention in a member state in order to preempt or respond to crisis situations (Powell, 2005:20-21). The indifference of AU mirrors the commonality of Gaddafi’s phenomenon in most African states, thus discouraging intervention. Omer (2011), notes that views throughout the continent are mixed, and “the military action should be a warning against African leaders clinging to power or involved in human rights violations”. That could provide additional reasons why some African governments oppose military action. In addition, Samkange (2002:8-21) points out that the trend towards intervention, especially for humanitarian and other motives, has not been enthusiastically welcomed in post-colonial Africa. According to him, the ad hoc and sometimes seemingly arbitrary nature of the interventions that have taken place in the past has given many governments and commentators cause for concern, and the stakes in the intervention debate are therefore extremely high, especially for Africa. On the one side is the potential ability to take effective action to save large numbers of human lives or perhaps defend essential human and humanitarian interests. On the other side is the very real danger that poorly planned or executed interventions will do more harm on the ground than good, while weakening the norm of non-intervention in international relations may increase the likelihood and potential for conflict between and among states” (Samkange, 2002:8-21). However, Thakur (2012) notes that one of the most visible lessons one could draw from the interventions in Libya and Cote d’lvoire is that the African Union leaders are still sharply divided on the notion of external intervention in spite of the adherence to the principle of R2P. Two dynamics arose from this. Firstly, the anti-imperialist rhetoric was advanced while the credibility of the continental organization was questioned regarding their stance on peers who unleashed extreme violence on their own citizens. Secondly, one needs to interrogate the insistence on home-grown solutions, peaceful solution even when the threat of gross human right abuses has become imminent.
The AU failed from the start to persuade the West to take the sort of cautious, political approach it has taken with other countries involved in the “Arab Spring”. In Bahrain, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, “we have made clear that security alone cannot resolve the challenges facing Bahrain … violence is not the answer, a political process is”. However, a diplomatic solution has been resisted by Western powers and NATO in Libya. While the AU voted against UN Security Council intervention in Libya, African representatives on the UNSC (South Africa, Gabon and Nigeria) voted for the intervention (Mqolomba, 2011). This inconsistency is common in AU and reflects lack of unity of purpose among the leaders.
OBTRUSIVE VENDETTA ON GADDAFI FOR HIS WRONGS AGAINST THE WEST
The emergence of Gaddafi in 1969 introduced autocratic style of leadership in Libya that frequently rendered his regime to friction and unfriendly relations with the international community. On assumption of office, he appointed himself as the defender of Arab nationalism, and embarked on closure of all the American and British military bases in the country (ST. JOHN, 2010:50). The growing western enmities, not only against his regime, but essentially his person, kept resonating. Apart from his rigid oil regime which targets the West, as already discussed in the preceding section, Gaddafi maintained ardent support for Jihad, to strengthen Arab unity and there from seek the freedom of the oppressed and slaved Arab people, first of all Palestinians. He created the Jihad Fund in 1970, to support the armed struggle for the liberation of the Arab territories occupied by Zionists (ST. JOHN R. B., 2010). Gaddafi was disposed to freeing Palestine from the Israeli occupation and was desirous of eliminating the entire state of Israel, along with the Western colonialist presence all over Africa. He demonstrated this mission, first by helping Yasser Arafat’s PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) both militarily and economically. In the same vein, he sent Libyan soldiers to Lebanon in 1971, in order to support the government against the Israeli incursion in the country. The Libyan presence in Lebanon wasalso reinforced in 1978, when Gaddafi equipped the Libyan army with missiles apt to discourage aerial Israeli raids (BOCA, 2010).
In Africa, he supported the Eritrean Liberation Front; the Zimbabwe’s African National Union in Rhodesia; sent armaments to Guinea, threatened by the neighbour’s countries. In addition, he supported groups such as the Irish Republican Army, sending its members a huge amount of armaments in 1971. Gaddafi later explained that his support to the Irish people was not intended as an act against Great Britain (BOCA, 2010). However, his avid supports to these liberation struggles earned him the enmity of most Western countries thriving in colonial empires. Besides, Gaddafi was severally implicated in terrorist activities, which sometimes snowballed into open hostility or violent confrontations between Libya and the US. He created Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine, and the members committed severe violations of human rights and other heinous crimes in order to fulfil their goals. They were found guilty of the attack to the Athens’ international airport on the 5th August, 1973, and Fiumicino airport on the 17th December 1973. In the first attack, four people died and fifty-five injured, while thirty twopeople lost their lives in the second attack (BOCA, 2010). In addition, the CIA 1981 annual report on international terrorism, stated that, only in 1980, seven hundred and sixty terrorist attacks occurred and that this increase was due to the role of the government of Libya into Middle East terrorist organizations. The report specified that Libya had launched new tendencies in the terrorist field, killing the political opponents migrated to Europe and diplomats in Middle East. Furthermore, the US Department of State published a White Paper on January 8, 1985, detailing the terrorism acts perpetrated by Gaddafi. It stated that the dictator had used terrorism as one of the main tool of foreign policy and that he supported groups and organizations using terroristic attacks (BOCA, 2010).
On April 14, 1986, USA launched air strikes against Libya as a response to the continuous Libyan aid to terrorist groups. The raid involved about one hundred Air Force and Navy aircraft. The targets were military and “terrorism” centres: in total, five of them were hit, along with Gaddafi’s headquarter. The day after the American attack, Libyan patrol boats fired missiles at the US communication stations in Lampedusa, Italy (BOCA, 2010). The 1986 American raid on Benghazi and Tripoli was condemned by the United Nations General Assembly in Res. 41/38, (A/RES/41/38, November 20, 1986). On December 21st, 1988, the 259 people on board of the Pan Am Flight 103 died as a consequence of its explosion over Lockerbie (Scotland). The Flight departed from Heathrow Airport (London) to New York; 179 passengers were American, while the others came from various parts of the world. The Lockerbie disaster was perceived as a direct attack against the United States of America (Rosenberg, 1988). On the 14th November, 1991, the United States and Britain formerly accused Libya of being responsible for the Lockerbie attack. In particular, they picked out two Libyan men as directly responsible for the disaster: ‘Abd al-Basit al-Maqrahi and al-Amin KhalifaFahimah. In addition, France accused Libya of the breaking up of the French UTA DC-10 over the Sahara desert in 1989 (RONEN, 2008: p. 43). Gaddafi refused to hand them over for trial, arguing that Libyan law made it difficult for Libyan people to be extradited, but could be tried internally by applying the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (The UN 1971 Convention). This gave birth to three UNSC Resolutions to force his compliance, including:
(i) Res. 731, approved on the 21st January, 1992 – aimed at pressurising Libya to handover the suspects (UNSC Res. 731).
(ii) Res. 748 approved on the 31st March, 1992, to ban air travel and arms sales to-Libya and reduces the Libyan -diplomatic representation if the order was not carried by the 15th April, 1992 (UNSC Res. 748).
(iii) Res. 883 approved on the 11th November, 1993, including ban on the sales of oil equipment (UNSC Res. 883).
He finally complied in 2003 and satisfied all the allied conditions before all the embargos on Libya were lifted. Though Gaddafi cooperated in the fight against terrorism since the episode of 9/11 attack on America, it was not deemed a sufficient atonement for his alleged crimes against the West. The fact is that the “Western nations are at the onset of a process which they, hope, culminates in the departure of Gaddafi in a regime change plan” (Adujie, 2011). Long before the crisis broke out, Gaddafi accused the West to have undertaken a crusade against Libya, the state-appointed Tripoli’s imam even called for a jihad to defeat the West (RONEN, 2008). This argument is based on the notion that the West had, for many decades, struggled to engineer a regime change in Libya (revenge of Gaddafi misdeeds) and lately in Cote d’lvoire(perceived anti-French stance by Laurent Gbagbo) as a means of re-establishing its stranglehold on these countries. It represents an attempt to further the power of US capitalism, with little interest in the welfare of the people involved (Zounmenou and Loua, 2011). As it was the case with Gaddafi, Chomsky (2003) argues that western forces intervened not to protect Albanian Kosovans from Serbian aggression (as they claimed), but to humiliate and weaken Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who had remained resistant to western demands for years. The western criticism of foreign human rights abuses is politically motivated, highlighting that while the US were intervening in Kosovo, they were simultaneously supporting the governments of Turkey, Colombia and Indonesia, all of whom were involved in widespread human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing (Chomsky, 2003). This conforms to the US government’s belief that it should take part in “preventive war” against states who threaten its global hegemony, despite the illegality of these actions under international law. Using the 2003 invasion of Iraq as an example, he shows how the US government and the media portrayed the Iraq government of Saddam Hussein as a threat to the US and other Middle Eastern states”.
Some scholars like Rieff (2008), Thakur (2011), and Adujie (2011) summarize the set of issues involved in framing international intervention in Libya into three. These are the military capacity, legal authority and political legitimacy to intervene in Libya. They argue that only the West has the requisite assets and operational capacity for military intervention in Libya; so the responsibility fell on the West to handle that. The legal authority was provided by the UNSC resolution while the political legitimacy was achieved with the support of the Arab League and African Union. This forms the premise of argument by Qutait (2011), that some anti-interventionists are intent on justifying their stance at all costs, to the extent of looking or minimizing the atrocities committed against Libyan citizens by the Gaddafi regime, so as to bolster arguments against the intervention. She opposes the positions of anti-interventionist who accuse the West of double standards and selective intervention. It was her view that, “the case of Libya was obviously different from other Arab countries experiencing revolution like Tunisia; Egypt etc. Unlike in other Arab countries, where regimes at least made pretence of understanding the demand for greater freedom, in Libya there was a blatant demonization of protesters as rats and cockroaches” (Qutait, 2011). But Adujie (2011) reiterates that the simple fact that the intervention was in Libya, not in Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc, shows that the sole target was Gaddafi. On the other hand, Western failures to defend the dignity and rights of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation have been especially damaging to their claims to promote human rights and oppose humanitarian atrocities universally instead of selectively” (Thakur, 2012). Furthermore, none denies the fact that after the Libyan Air Force was completely annihilated, the continued ‘humanitarian’ bombing shows that the west, through NATO, intends to impose their interests in North Africa, turning Libya into a colonial protectorate”. Moros (2011) reinforces this, noting that “right now there is a very serious threat to global peace: a new cycle of colonial wars, which started in Libya, with the sinister goal of refreshing the capitalist global system, within a structural crisis today, but without any limit to its consumer and destructive voracity”.
ABUSE OF R2P AND VIOLATION OF THE UN CHARTER
Article 2:7 of the UN prohibits intervention; in addition, the GA/R.2131, restates the inviolability of states sovereignty and notes in Section (x), that the strict observance of these obligations is an essential condition to ensure that nations live together in peace with one another, since the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international peace and security” (UNGA Res. 2131 (XX) 1965). Intervention measures were streamlined to address issues relating to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Essentially, the Rome Statute created an International Criminal Court which can exercise criminal jurisdiction for offences set out in articles 6 (genocide), 7 (crimes against humanity), 8 (war .crimes), and 9 (crime of aggression), subject to the principle of complementarity (where the state to which the accused belongs may exercise criminal jurisdiction instead) -(Paphiti, 2011). There were also the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 1 that apply in International Armed Conflict (IAC) and the common article 3 and AP11, which apply in internal, Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC). Incidentally, Libya acceded to the GCs (2/5/1956) and API & 11 (7/06/1978). Article 3 of the APII of 8 June 1977 clearly supports nonintervention and states that:
- Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a
State or the responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State. - Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external
affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that conflict occurs
(Paphiti, 2011).
These were significantly violated in Libya, where the Amnesty International Report of September 2011, admitted that “at time of writing there is in Libya a non-international’s armed conflict between al-Gaddafi forces and opposition fighters. There is also currently an international armed conflict between the NATO-led coalition forces and the al-Gaddafi forces. …” IAC will trigger the Geneva Conventions and API, whereas common article 3 will apply to NIAC (Amnesty International’s Report, September 2011:7). Indifference to these provisions was a big flaw. The political crisis in Libya was essentially internal and did not pose threats to international peace and security to necessitate military action in support of the rebel forces seeking to oust Col Gaddafi. Although the intervention was authorized by the UNSC Resolution 1973, the key rules of the R2P were not rigorously observed and thereby signaled a significant breach of the legal premise to intervene in Libya. It shows relegation of relevant binding laws in a bid to rationalize humanitarian intervention against nonintervention principle in the UN Charter.
Firstly, the state’s responsibility to protect their own population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crime against humanity was not consistent with the nature of Libyan uprising. Gaddafi could not be held responsible for protecting rebels that took up arms against his government which the international community could have seen as criminal insurrection. In addition, it is questionable whether Gaddafi’s threats against the people of Benghazi, taken at their highest, actually amounted to the offence of genocide. Amnesty International found no evidence to say genocide was occurring in Libya. It asked, “did coalition action prevent it, or was it precipitous”? After the collapse of the regime, NATO did not prevent attacks on Tawerghans by the rebel forces they were supporting. Some described this as genocide (Human Rights Reports 26 September 2011). Secondly, the responsibility of the international community to assist the state in meeting those responsibilities was neglected either by omission or commission. Having presumed that Gaddafi has lost control of the political crisis in Libya, R2P makes it the responsibility of the international community to assist the state in meeting those responsibilities. Failure to take this step as alternative to direct military action targeted at Libyan leadership, which ought to be last option; suggested sinister motive and violates the provision that states should refrain from any action or attempt in whatever form or under whatever pretext to destabilize or to undermine the stability of another State or of any of its institutions; (A/RES/36/103). Thirdly, the responsibility of the international community to take timely and decisive actions in cases where a state has manifestly failed to protect its own population from these crimes was swiftly considered by the UNSC, thereby occasioning coalition military action led by NATO. It clearly contravenes the provision that states should, refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities within other States, under any pretext whatsoever, or any action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political order of other States; (A/RES/36/103).Members by juxtaposing their national interests and impeding consensus on R2P norm.
Based on the foregoing findings, there is need to amend the UN Charter to clearly state the definite status of NATO in the affairs of the organization and under what conditions it should be engaged in military intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. The R2P architecture should be overhauled for strict control; it has to be goal guided and not left wide open for all manner of abuse by any of the intervening states. It should be enforced objectively on all states that are culpable of genocide, human rights violations, war crime and crimes against humanity so that sense of impartiality and justice underlying UN Charter will douse suspicion on the objective of intervention by member states and build strong support for R2P. There is need for collaboration and commitment to internal governance structure in Africa and Arab nations. The challenge posed by autocratic regimes in these regions call for rethink among the leadership to embrace popular demands for liberalization of the political space and allow the wishes of the masses to ensure political stability.
Kikoler (2009) argues that, neither R2P nor any other such norm of international conduct could be applied fairly … so long as “today’s system” permits powerful countries to ignore elements of international law which they find inconvenient, “some great powers” resort to the use of force in violation of the Charter, and no means exist to “enforce accountability” upon such abusers. This was the case in Libya where regime change became a feature of UK/French/NATO policy in the course of the campaign, and was never authorized by the UNSCR. The arming of rebels by Qatar and France was also a breach of the arms embargo (Paphiti, 2011). The human rights organization, Amnesty International and the Aid Organization, ‘Doctors Without Borders’ reported that torture and ill-treatment is widespread among military and security forces and armed rebels who run prisons; for which NATO is responsible since it has brought this band of criminals into power (Freeman, 2012 ). He further states that with the intervention, “the worst thing happened to Black people, no matter if migrants or native Libyans. They were slaughtered and thrown into mass graves by the hundreds. It is always the same colonial powers like the U.S, UK and France and its NATO accomplices who perform one war of conquest after another. Under the pretext of UN Resolution 1973, which merely meant to enforce a “no-fly zone” and an arms embargo – both allegedly to protect the Libyans from Muammar Gaddafi – the present assault was staged as a ruthless act of aerial warfare, coordinated with murderous rebels on the ground (Freeman, 2012).
The inference, therefore, is that regime change was the primary goal of NATO in Libya and not to solve her multifarious problems that have their origin in ethnic cum religious intolerance and predates the present impasse. In a narrative, many Libyans decried the consequences of the intervention and held the view that, we have learned what NATO meant by “protection of the civilian population.” We are witnessing the rape of Libya by the West, the funeral of the Revolution which served the working class and could be seen, within the limits of a strictly Islamic mentality, as a role model for other countries in Africa as well. In retrospect, they retorted that the oil wealth served the Libyan population as well, but not anymore. The NATO war is only the beginning of the destruction of Libya, where now a brutal civil war is being waged. The various rebel factions are fighting against each other or against remnants of Gaddafi loyalists. An “Iraqi” situation is the result, with a destroyed infrastructure and a lack of food, water etc.; of course it is the civilian population that suffers terribly (Freeman, 2012). The intervention clearly exceeded the parameters originally set forth by UN Security Council resolution 1973, which authorized the international use of force to establish a “no fly” zone over Libya and to protect civilians; the UN resolution made no mention of regime change or government overthrow, though this clearly was NATO’s main objective from the beginning. The Security Council also called for a Libyan arms embargo, a stipulation that NATO has ignored by arming the Libyan rebels. The intervention has not only violated international law, but US law as well: The Obama administration’s decision to participate in the war was undertaken with no congressional authorization over an extended period, thus violating the provisions of the 1973 War Powers Resolution. The intervention has been an extended exercise in illegality. Supporters of the war seem willing to overlook these legal shortcomings because of the “higher purpose” of the intervening powers (Gibbs, 2011).
CONCLUSION
This study has shown the subsisting fallacies in NATO’s intervention in Libya. Besides oil interest, vengeance mission, weakness or indifference of institutional peace mechanism, the application of R2P or humanitarian intervention in Libya and not in Syria, Bahrain, or Yemen, etc is selective justice. Hamilton and Solomon (2012) corroborate this and note that ‘‘…the West and the Arabs quickly granted recognition to a revolutionary national council as the sole legitimate government of Libya. They are not close to doing the same for the splintered SNC in Syria. There is also little chance they will agree to arm rebels’’. The reasons reflect the different impacts national interests exert on the intervening states.
In this case, NATO’s intervention in Libya was tainted by regime change that defied the intendment of humanitarian intervention and UNSC authorization for use of force to protect civilian populations. Aligning with the rebel forces was in breach of UN resolutions and acts in absurdity. This results in the abuse of R2P, worsening of humanitarian condition and violation of the country’s sovereignty. It has created suspicion among the third world countries that the motive in any intervention was to serve external interests. The use of every excuse bordering on human rights violations to back dissidents committing insurrection against their states is questionable and inadmissible. This is where the UN Charter is desecrated in NATO’s intervention in Libya, thereby jeopardizing the prospects of R2P being looked upon as a watertight measure to forestalling blatant violations of human rights, genocidal attacks, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity, in the future.
Notwithstanding, Arab Spring phenomenon exposed the tyranny of many sit tight regimes in the region and Africa and the preference the people have shown for democracy as a form of government. The challenge to autocratic regimes call for rethink among the leadership to embrace popular demands for liberalization of the political space and allow the wishes of the masses to ensure political stability.
THE RECOMMENDATIONS
Having analyzed the fallacies of NATO’s humanitarian intervention and regime change in Libya, it becomes incumbent on this study to offer some recommendations as solution to the identified problems. Most significantly, the UN Charter should be amended to clearly state the definite status of NATO in the affairs of the organization and under what conditions it should be engaged in military intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Currently, the UN does not have a standing army apart from ‘‘Military Committee of the Council’’ that approves plans for the measure when such occasion arises. It therefore relies on member states for enforcement actions. NATO, is not a Regional Organization (UN Article 53) but a Defense Pact (UN Article 51), with clearly defined mandates (NATO Article 5). It has continued, arbitrarily, to usurp this vacuum in the SC enforcement mechanism. The ambiguity trails its meddling role in the affairs of UN, and seems to have authenticated the allegation that NATO members have colonized the UN to further their imperialistic and capitalist agenda, particularly in the developing societies. And this is indisputable when looked at each of their interventions and its association with Western interests.
The Arab League and African Union should be assertive and proactive in addressing internal affairs of their member states and not create room for external intervention, knowing its development and security implications on the region and the continent. The Peace Security Council of the AU will lack in enforcement powers if there is indifference among the leadership. There should be internal mechanism guided by spirit of unison, for settling threatening crisis in any African state rather than build clandestine alliances to shield the culprits. This will first start by changing the sit tight and insensitive leadership orientations of African heads of states, and channeling their minds to the realities of the contemporary world. They must realize that democracy and respect for human rights has become a template for global regime and abdicate, as early as possible, autocratic regimes that are fast waning.
The UN should invoke all treaties and laws relating to arms proliferation and other weapons of war to limit circulation and use of these illegal arms for subversive operations. The world cannot be a peaceful place if the concern of the developed world is to continue to export these weapons to the third world countries, which have the potential of deepening ethnic antagonism and religious volatility, including political violence commonly experienced in these societies. It does not make sense to stoke fire of war and suddenly turn to seek intervention to halt carnage. Such wars become a golden opportunity to create viable markets for the arms (despite arms embargo) to further increase the spate of the crisis with the consequent damages.
The R2P architecture should be overhauled for strict control; it has to be goal guided and not left wide open for all manner of abuse by any of the intervening states. It should be enforced objectively on all nations and states that are culpable so that sense of justice binding all members will sustain their loyalty. In other words, there should be clearly stated sanctions which any violation of the set goals must be made to suffer. Once this provision is made, it will restrain the ruthlessness of those who hide under the mandate of R2P to perpetrate all kinds of evil in pursuit of their national interests. Neutrality of such selfish ambition and genuine commitment to humanitarian concerns is the only sure way to reinforcing the efficacy of R2P in waging future war against untoward acts such as war crimes, repression, and the excesses of autocratic regimes.
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Tim M. (2007). The African Union’s Transition from Non-intervention to Non-Indifference: An Ad hoc Approach to the Responsibility to Protect?” Centre for International Cooperation and Security, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford
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Wheeler, N. (2002). Saving Strangers. Oxford: Oxford University Press Zuki, M. (2011). Huge majority of Arabs want Gaddafi removed from power. The Doha Debates. 18 May 2011, http://www.thedohadebates.com/news/item.asp?