Nwanegbo, Chukwuemeka1
Department Of Political Science
Nwafor Orizu College Of Education
Nsugbe
Okafor,Uche(LLB)2
Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka.
Abstract
This article is an attempt to determine the constitutionality of local government creation by some state governments in Nigeria. After examining the constitutional powers of both the National and State Houses of Assemble, the article concludes that it is the constellational responsibility of the state to create local governments.
Introduction
Sometime in 2003, some states of the federation embarked on the creation of local government. These states including Lagos, Anambra and Enugu State are purported to have done this creation pursuant to the provisions or sections 4(7) (a) 7(1) and 8(3) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. But the Federal Government had in a swift reaction announced its rejection or refusal to recognize the newly created local governments. So, whereas the Enugu State Government decided to revert back to the existing local government under the constitution in sheepish obedience to the announcement by the Federal government, while those created in Anambra State by the outgoing Mbadinuju Administration was cancelled by the incoming Ngige Administration almost immediately after creation, Lagos state on its part stood its ground and rather elected to challenge the withholding of the statutory allocation due to it – a decision which the Federal government has taken to force Lagos State to return to the old order – than to be cowed into total submission to the dictates of the Federal government. In trying to find out the constitutionality of the Local Government creation exercise of the state governments, it is important to begin this work with understanding of the relevant concepts. Then after, to run an analysis of the powers of the National Assembly in order to really find where lies the local government creating power, as well as examining the constitutionally of such local government creation as done by some states in accordance with the findings:
Conceptualizing Local Government
Local Government is a form of devolution of the political powers of the state. It is the government of grassroots, which is designed to serve as an instrument for rural development. L0(;al Government has been defined as the political subdivision of a nation or (in a federal system) a state, which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs including the powers to impose taxes and exert labour for prescribed purposes (UN office for public Admin, 1996). Golding (1975) defines Local Government as, the management of their own affairs by the people of a locality. For Oyediran (1988) it is the government in which “popular participation both in the choice of decision makers and in the decision making process is conducted by local bodies which, recognizing the supremacy of the central government, is able and willing to accept responsibility for its decision.”
While the Federal Government (GLGR, 1976) defined Local Government as “government at the local level exercised through representative councils established by law to exercise specific powers within defined areas”. In the case of Oluokun V. Governor of Oyo State (5NCLR, 680, 1984) the meaning of local government was given thus: “the term ‘local government’ in the context is used in section 7(1) of the 1979 constitution refers to the system of administration through local government councils, in the local government area”. From these various definitions, it can be seen that there is no generally accepted definition of what local government is. Hence, different people define it as it suits the notion of whether local government is an outpost of a bigger government or as a government of its own (Nwanegbo. 2004). However, it is important to note that there is a difference between local government and local Administration. While Local Government involves political authority, Local Administration connotes administrative authority. Ideally, Local Government involves both the legislative and executive processes operating under democratic principle of popular participation of the local people in the management of their local affairs. On the other hand, local administration is a bureaucratic process aimed at the provision of local services (Ogunna, 1996). Such differences are also notable between local government and local institution. In the case of Kagona v Governor of Kaduna State (2 NCLR 529, 1981), it was held that “Local institution” is not synonymous with local Government as established under the Local Government Law.
In the context of this article, we shall define local government as a political sub-division of a state, which has a legal existence under the law and is run by elected representatives of the local people, with substantial autonomy in administrative and financial affairs. Local Government is a corporate personality, which can sue and be sued with perpetual succession. Generally, it is created by law and instrument of a central government (in a unitary system of government), or of a state Government (in Federal system). Hence Local Government is a creation of central/state government, which has the power to make and unmake it. The implication of this is that Local Government status is governed by the’ Dillon rule’. The “Dillon Rule” was named after Justice Dillon of the Supreme Court of Iowa who declared that
Municipal corporations owe their origin to and derive their powers and rights wholly from the (state) legislative. It breathes in the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy it may abridge and control. (See Maxwell, 1969).
The above statement forcefully expresses the fact that local governments are generally created by and derived their powers from states (in Federal state) or central government (in a Unitary State). In other words, Local Governments are derivates of State/Central Government and not constitutional creations. This is the position of Local Government in most countries of the world. It was also exactly the status of local government in Nigeria under the 1979 constitution, and presently under 1999 constitution.
The 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria does not only guarantee the system of local government by democratically elected Local Government Councils but goes further to state that state governments shall ensure their existence under a law which provides for their establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions. [See section 7(1)]
Local Government Creation
This is the act of breaking down into smaller units, the size of an existing local government. Some may simply see it as carving out of new local government area. In as much as this declination is also correct, the new areas are usually carved out of the existing ones, as the entire Federation has non accommodated space for a new local government to spring up from.
Various reasons have been advanced as the need for new local government. Some of them are: to still bring government and thence development much more closer to the people and localities; to set up a unit or government for more homogenous communities and solve the problems of conflicts of interest among the homogenous people of a local government; to make administration of local areas easier. In addition, states create local government to balance the perceived imbalance between them and other states. Government officials give local governments as gift to their people. It is also used to build more as well as reduce political control of parties and interests (like NPP Programme in the second republic in Anambra State). The politics of local government creation is as deep in Nigeria as the politics of state creation and both of them are synonymous with the politics of revenue allocation.
Under Nigerian Federation, the politics of revenue allocation has been a raging and devastating one, and has been central to the numerous problems that pervade the Nigerian body politics, including the recent intractable issue of derivation (For more Politics of revenue allocation see Okeke. 2004). It is a fact that every local government is entitled to a statutory allocation from the federal government. This is provided for in the 1999 constitution of Nigeria. Therefore, for a state, the more the number of local governments, the more the resources available for the development of the local areas of the state.
States resolve to create more local government in Nigeria, in addition, to the earlier mentioned, hinges on their effort to attract more resources (allocation) for their state development through the local government. Therefore, creation of local government in Nigeria is both politically and economically motivated.
Powers of The National Assembly
By section 4(2) and (4), of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, the National Assembly shall have power to make laws with respect to the following:
- Any matter included in the Exclusive legislative list (which excludes the exercise of powers by the state)
(ii) Any matter in the Concurrent Legislative List (which power it shares
with the states);
(iii) Any other matter to which the Constitution empowers it to make law
(also itemized as item 67 of the exclusive legislative list).
The Exclusive list set out in part I of the second schedule include the following: accounts of the government of the Federation, Arms, Ammunition and Explosives, Aviation, Banking, Borrowing of money for the purposes of the Federation or of any state, Census, Citizenship, Copyright, CREATION OF STATE, Currency, Exchange Control, External Affairs; Immigration; Maritime; Military; Nuclear energy; Passports and Visas: Police etc (Ikpeazu, 2003).
In part II of the second schedule is the concurrent list which comprises the following: Allocation of Revenue; Archives; Collection of taxes; Electoral law; Electric power; Exhibition of cinematograph films; Industrial, Commercial or agricultural development; Scientific and technological research, Statistics, University, technological and post-primary education.
Powers Of The State Houses Of Assembly
By the provisions of the section 4(7), 1999 constitution, a state House of Assembly shall have power to make laws with respect to the following:
(a) Any matter not included in the Exclusive list (otherwise commonly known
as the residual list):
(b) Any matter in the Concurrent list (which power it shares with the Federal
Assembly);
(c) Any other matter to which the Constitution Empowers the States to make
laws.
As can be seen from the list, local government creation is not specific in the body of the constitution or in the legislative lists as being within federal competence. It is therefore residual matter, and as such lies within the exclusive competence of the state government (Nwabueze, 1982). The provision of section 4(7) (a) was sufficient authority upon which to find jurisdiction in the state Assembly, as opposed to the National Assembly, to make laws in respect of the matters not mentioned in both the exclusive list and the concurrent list, particularly creation of local governments (see Oluyede, 1992). Therefore, since under the Exclusive list where the National Assembly is authorized to make law, what was provided expressly is only for creation of states by parity of reasoning, creation of local government which was not expressly provided for in any of the lists in the schedule to the Constitution, was as a residual matter, intended by the draftsman to be left in the exclusive domain of the states Assembly, thus in agreement with the rule of interpretation of statutes. “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius that’ is the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another (Okpalauba, 1992).
In accordance with the underlying principle of federalism, which requires that, within the framework of a central government, matters of local concern should be managed by the state government, federal government involvement in local government is thus a contradiction of the very idea of federalism as enriched in the constitution (see Nwabueze, 1982).
Furthermore, section 7 (1) of the Constitution (1999) makes abundant clears the position of local government as being in the residual legislated powers of state assemblies, when it provides that:
The system of Local Government by democratically elected local government councils is under this Constitution guaranteed: and accordingly the Government of every state shall ensure their establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils.”
From the above quotation, it is clear that it is entirely correct that the authority of local government councils is derived solely from the constitution. Indeed, as “the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions” of local councils are to be provided for by a state law in each state as seen from the section 7(1).quote (Oluyede, 1992).
There is the contention that the creation of local government areas is also the responsibility of the National Assembly. The reasoning behind this contention is that since the area of each state is defined in the Constitution under section by reference to named local areas which happen to be the same as the existing local government areas, the creation of local government areas will necessarily involve a constitutional amendment by mean of legislation enacted by the National Assembly, with the approving resolution of the Houses of Assembly of not less than two-thirds of all the states. The argument came up in the celebrated case of Chief Sule Balogun v Attorney General of Lagos State and others wherein the court held inter alia
“Section 3(2) of the constitution does no more than define the area of each state in the Federation and does not prescribe the local government councils which must exist in each for any period of time until the First Schedule of the Constitution is amended. The National government is not granted any power under the constitution either in the exclusive legislative list or otherwise to make laws with respect to the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of local government councils but such powers are expressly vested in the government of every state i.e the House of Assembly of every state. From the grammatical construction of section 3 and 7 of the constitution, the intention of framers of the constitution was to prescribe in section 3 the number of state in the Federation, the geographical areas of each state and to make provision as to the Federal Capital Territory but not to restrict the powers expressly given to the state governments in section 7.” (1NCLR31, 1981,1.N.C.L.R, 51, 1981)
The important point to note (from the above decision) is that the designation of the areas in the Constitution carries no implication as to the number of local government councils that may exist within each of them. The area of a state, ~s defined by reference to the named localities, would not have been increased or decreased by the establishment of two or more local government councils within each of the named areas. Therefore, the combined effect of section 3(2) read with the First Schedule is to describe the area of each state; the emphasis is on the area and not on the names of the local governments. The local government have been mentioned in the schedule to identify the area and not to entrench the local governments more especially where section 3(2) nowhere uses the word “local governments” when a state creates some new local governments, it can do so only out of the existing local government areas and thus the area of a state would remain the same. Therefore, the first schedule according to Chand, (1982), is not affected at all when new local governments are created within a state. In other words, creation of local government areas does not imply any change in the boundaries of a state; the boundaries of a state remain unchanged.
Procedure For The Creation Of New Local Government Area
Having seen where lies the power to create local government, the burning question that is to be answered is: how then are new local councils supposed to be created? It is imperative here to proceed with analysis of the relevant provision in the constitution. Under section 8(3), the process of creating new local councils includes:
- A request to the state House of Assembly as prescribed in section 8(3) (a);
- Approval of the request by a referendum – section 8(3) (b);
- Approval of the result of the referendum by members of the local councils in the state – section 8 (3) (c); and
- Approval of the same result by the House of Assembly section 8 (3 ) (d)
The four steps in section 8 (3) necessarily to culminate in the passage of a law by the state legislature for the creation of the new local government councils. Subsections (5) and (6) of section 8 provides:
(5) An act of the National Assembly passed in accordance with this section shall make consequential provisions with respect to the names and headquarters of states or local government areas as provided in section 3 of this constitution and in Part I and II of the First Schedule to this Constitution.
(6) For the purpose of enabling the National Assembly to exercise the powers conferred upon it by subsection (5) of this section, each House of Assembly shall after the creation of more local government areas pursuant to, subsection (3) of this section ( emphasis ours) make adequate returns to each I louses of the Nat ional Assembly.”
Whereas section 3(6) provides thus:
“There shall be seven hundred and sixty-eight local government areas in Nigeria as shown in the second column of Part I of the First Schedule to this Constitution.”
We prefer to interpreter the last mentioned provision i.e. section 3(6) immediately. Section 7 (1) uses the words “establishment”, “structure”, and “function” which clearly point to the fact that the local government councils which state government have been enjoined to ensure their existence, i are totally different from those already established under section 3 (6) and Part I, First Schedule of the Constitution. Again by subsection (5) of section 8, the National Assembly has the Constitutional obligation to “make consequential provision” to include the names and headquarters of the newly created local governments into the constitution. In essence, the drafters of the constitution intended the amendment section 3(6) of the constitution following local government creation. This means that the provision of 768 local government areas in section 3 subsection (6) could be altered to either a higher or even a lower number (Uwais CJN, 2005 cited in Guardian, 4/1/05).The import of subsection (3) of section 8 is that a new local government area or council, could only be created by a state after the steps enumerated therein have been complied with before a bill to that effect could validly be passed by the House of Assembly of the states (see Guardian, 14/12/2004). That is a local government comes into existence immediately the procedure or steps outlined in subsection (3) had been taken by State. The opening words of subsection (3) “a bill for a law of a House of Assembly for the purpose of creating a new local government area shall only be passed if-(a); (b); (c); (d).”
What this means is that it is only when process eg as provided in paragraphs (a) to (d) has been taken that the House of Assembly can pass a law creating new local governments; apart from the requirements in (a) to (d), nothing else is expected or required for the purpose of creating a new local government area [see section8(3)] -The combined effect of subsection (3) (5) and (6) of section 8 is that the power of the National Assembly to amend Parts I and II of the first schedule to the constitution is merely consequential; it exists “after the creation of more local government areas pursuant to subsection (3)”. Again this power to amend section 3(6) is not supervisory power over the power of local government creation exercisable by the State Assembly under sections 7 (1) and 8(3). Rather, it is a consequential provision to enable the National Assembly to update the local government areas as provided in section 3 of the constitution and in parts I and II of the first schedule to the constitution” by adding the newly created local governments to the already existing ones under the Constitution; a mere Constitutional obligation or duty (Achara, 2001).Thus, the total powers of the Federation under the constitution are divided between two spheres and not three spheres of government …. Residual powers, wherein local government creation lies by virtue of not being mentioned elsewhere, is provided for by section 4(7), and it is within this provision that the slate legislates for local government creation (Achara 2001):Constitutionality Of The Creation Of New Local Government Area: The Case Of A.G. Lagos State V A.G. Federation While in the course of writing this paper, the supreme court judgment on local government creation and withholding of statutory allocations of public revenue due to Lagos State councils came to light on Friday, December 10th. 2004. The judgment was from the action instituted at the instance or the Lagos State government against the federal government, as earlier noted. The issue raised by the plaintiff was whether the federal government had the power to withhold its statutory allocations as it did. In its own counterclaim, the defendant raised the question whether a state government could create a local government, even when the National Assembly had not passed the consequential Act envisaged by section 8(6).The supreme court in a ratio of 5 to 2 (Uwaifo and Akintan. JJ.S.S dissenting) decided as follows:
Per Uwais CJN (lead judgment):
Having read all the provision of the constitution aforementioned, I am satisfied that the House of Assembly of Lagos State has the right to pass the creation of Local Government Areas Law No 5 of 2002 and to amend it by passing the creation of Local Government Areas (Amendment) law 2004. What follows is that the laws enacted by Lagos State that is, Law No 5 of 2002 and the 2004 law are both valid laws since the I louse of Assembly of Lagos State has the power under section 4 subsections (6) and (7), 7 subsection (I) and 8 subsection (3) of the constitution to legislate in respect of the creation of new local government areas and local government councils which are one and the same for the purpose of section 162 subsections (3) and (5) of the constitution. However in the context of section 8 subsection (5) and section3 subsection (6), such laws cannot be operative or have full effect until the National Assembly makes the necessary amendment to section 3 subsection (6) and Part 1 of the First Schedule to the Constitution. The effect of this is that the laws are valid but inculcate until the necessary steps as provided by the Constitution are taken by the National Assembly.”
Honourable Justice I.L Kutigi followed suit in the following terms:
“1 have no difficulty whatsoever in coming to the conclusion that the Lagos State Government Law No. 5 of 2002 is unquestionably Constitutional and valid having compile with the provision of section 7(1) and 8 (5) of the Constitution. The only reservation is that the newly created local government areas are in abeyance until after the completion of the Second or Federal tier procedure by the National Assembly as stated above”.
Iguh, Tobi and Edozie, JJ.S.C are also in agreement.
However, Uwaifo and Akintan took a radically different stand interpreting section 8(5) and
with great attention, Justice Akintan came to the conclusion that –
“The creation of local government councils is entirely a state affair. This is why it is provided in section 8(5) that the National Assembly is only required to make consequential
provisions with respect to the names and headquarter or councils as provided in section 3 and Parts I and II of the First Schedule. Also in section 8(6), the House of Assembly is required to make adequate returns to the National Assembly ‘after the creation of more local government areas (with emphasis) to enable the National Assembly make the said consequential Provision under section 8(5).”His Lordship then took a careful excursion into different definition of the word “consequential”, all of which clearly suggest that it is something following as a consequence or corollary. His Lordship concluded his analysis thus:”I have no doubt that none of the definitions of the word “consequential” or “consequence” given above could lead to the inference that the role which the National Assembly has to play in section 8(5) of the Constitution is part of the process of creating the new local government councils. I believe that the process of creating the new local government councils has been completed before the National assembly is called upon to perform its own role under section 8(5) of the Constitution. It is therefore, not correct to say that the process of creating the new local government councils by the Lagos State was incomplete or inculcate until the National Assembly carries out its role under section 8(5) of the constitution.
Speaking along the same lines Justice Uwaifo resolved the matter as follows.”But I must say here and I doubt if it can be reasonably disputed that so long as all the processes and procedures laid down in subsection (3) and (4) of section 8 of the Constitution are complied with, a state House of Assembly has full powers to create new local government areas and indeed adjust boundaries as may be necessary. It must be noted that it is “after the creation of more local government area” that a House of Assembly shall make adequate returns to each houses of the National Assembly. In order words, the creation has been concluded and the relevant local government areas ha'{e been brought into being by the action taken by a House of Assembly through its bill before returns thereof are made. I strongly hold the view that the only purpose of the consequential provisions is to update the local government areas as provided in section 3 of this constitution and in parts I and II of the .First Schedule to this Constitution. It is like birth registration under the provisions of an Act. The delay in the formality of registration of any particular birth cannot ignore the fact that there has been born a child who is living. To my mind, it does not confer any supervisory authority on the National Assembly which it may use to delay, direct, control of frustrate the effect of a law duly enacted by a state (see report on Guardian, Dec. 21 , 2004). Honourable Justice Uwaifo had also suggested in his judgment that the state government could apply for an order of mandamus to compel the National Assembly to pass the Act to update the local government areas as provided under the constitution (Guardian, 21/12/004). With respect to the learned Justice of the Supreme Court, the apex court has laid to rest the lingering controversy over the critical steps to legally and constitutionally create new local governments, albeit in error. Firstly, Lagos State has a good case for seeking to create additional local councils, with the highest population but with less than half the number of councils in Kano State before the creation (See Guardian, 14/4/99). At its own level, it has fulfilled the entire requirement for bringing the councils into being. The 57 Local Government Councils were created as far back as 2002. Mr. President did not withhold the allocations of Lagos State until 2004 and when he did, he cited the creating state1 s intention in getting more allocation as their reasons for creating more local governments. This reason is baseless because as can be seen under the 1999 constitution, the quantum of statutory allocation due to a state Government from the Federal Account is unaffected by any increase or decrease in the number of Local Government Councils in the state (Osipitan, 2004). The position of the majority decision of the Supreme Court could therefore be seen to be wrong because creation of local government is specifically set out in paragraphs (a) to (d) of subsection (3) just as creation of State is set out in paragraph (a) to (d) of subsection (1) of section 8. Thus, if it was intended to be part of the process of local government creation, subsection (5) would have been included as one of the paragraphs in subsection (3). The same reason goes for state creation under subsection (1), and that is why it is justifiable to submit that subsection (5) applies both to subsection (I) and (3) as mere updating formalities, and nothing more (See clear wordings of section 8(5) as provided in section 3 of the 1999 constitution).
In the above light, we agree with the dissenting judgment into to Uwaifo JSC, particularly drew an apt analogy of birth registration to drive home the point. As he submits, that a child is not registered does not mean that he has not been born.
This dictum ought to have been the true position of the law on the issue at present. Unfortunately, it is in the minority. The majority view which represents the ratio of the court stands. Hence, the conflict in the section is made more clustered. The Federal Government on this note continue on its notion of supervisors and could either accept, approve or disapprove states action(s) which is, even though, constitutionally provided.
Conclusion and Suggestions
This work has in the last part tried to identify the avowed intention by the framers of the 1999 Constitution to maintain the territorial integrity known as Nigeria under the canopy of Federalism in the light of who exercises the power to create new local government areas. The fact that local Government Areas are entities within the state structures cannot be disputed. They, therefore, primarily come within the administrative competence of the state government. The fact that section 7 of the 1999 Constitution required the state legislature to ensure their existence under a law, which provides for the establishment, structures, composition, finance and function of such councils, is eloquent testimony of such unassailable truth (Ikpeazu, 2003).Contradistinction to the submissions of Onyechi Ikpeazu S.A.N (2003), the declared intention of the 1999 Constitution to instill true Federation/Federalism in this regard became crystallized when the exclusive legislative list, which is the legislative domain of the National Assembly only provided for creation of states (clearly leaving out creation of local governments) whereas the same Constitution which provided for exclusive list gave the state Houses of Assembly the power to make laws on any matter not included in the exclusive list (known as the residual list) and any other matter with respect to which it is empowered to make 18ws in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. Furthermore, section 8(3) outlined the procedure for creation of local government councils by the House of assembly, just as section 8(1) did to enable the National Assembly to create states. In this regard, we are not conceding 1(1 the argument that section 3(6) was enacted to entrench the seven hundred and sixty eight (768) local government areas listed in Part I First Schedule of the Constitution (See Federal Government submission in A.G Lagos State vs A.G Federation) for the simple reason that section 8(5), as a constitutional obligation, obliges the National Assembly to make consequential provisions to update in respect of not only the local government areas, but also states “as provided under section 3 of the Constitution”. In this light, therefore, the National Assembly whose duty it is to create states would not be heard, after going through the procedure under section 8( I) for creation of states to say that it has not completed the creation of such state until it has passed a consequential act to update the number of states under the Constitution. Hence, after the creation of local government areas by Lagos state bringing the tally to 57, the repealing of the and going back to the 20 councils structure under the constitution (as canvassed by the Federal government) would be, for the government and people of Lagos state, an abandonment of the constitutional right to create local government councils (Ipaye, 2004). Linking this situation to the birth registration of a new born child, Justice Uwaifo beautifully stated thus:
“The delay in the formality of registration of any particular birth cannot ignore the fact that there has been born a child who is living.” (18 NWLR).In the same vein, the fact that the National Assembly has not yet passed the Amendment Act to make consequential provisions in the Constitution following local council creation as done by any state cannot ignore the fact that a state has earlier on created local government areas (in accordance with the provision of section 8(3) of the constitution) which has now come into existence, [n other words, and according to Uwaifo, JSC, it does not confer any supervisory authority on the National Assembly, which it may use to delay, direct, control or frustrate the effect of a law duly enacted by a state.
In the light of the foregoing submission, we therefore make the following suggestions:
1. The National Assembly should be prevailed upon to perform its constitutional obligation and carry out its duty by passing the Amendment Act to update the Constitution to include the newly created local councils. Already, Lagos state lawmakers in the National Assembly have begun moves (championed by Senator – Tokunbo Afikuyomi) in this respect.
2. The learned Justice Uwaifo of the Supreme Court had in his judgment suggested that the state could, apply for an order of mandamus to compel the National Assembly to perform its duty under section 8(5) by passing the Act. This should be fully utilized if the present moves by Lagos state lawmakers in the National Assembly fails.
3. The case of A.G Lagos state v A.G Federation was with the greatest respect, wrongly decided, conflicting interpretations continue to trail the judgment even after the final verdict. This is why, as has already been observed (Guardian, 17/12/2004) it is our humble suggestion that the supreme Court should be ready to review its decision in order to finally lay to rest this unending controversy and to set the records straight.
4. As a final suggestion, the matter could be tabled before the ongoing National Political Reform Conference (or put comfortably, National Dialogue) as one of the pressing issues to be resolved, if at all the Dialogue will ever come up with a way forward for Nigerian federation.
On this note, we submit that the federal Government’s resolve to withhold allocations due to states that have created new local government areas, in order to compel them to revert back to the local councils existing under the—Constitution is a negation of the principles true federalism (Ipaye, 2004) a contradiction of the very idea of federalism (Nwabueze, 1982).The above suggestion should therefore be taken seriously if the Nation is to ensure the practice under the 1999 constitution of the true federalism. This last note of warning aligns with the observation of by Obikeze, (2004) that “No day passes without hearing or reading a piece that Nigeria should return to the practice of true federalism.”It is a well-meant call and must have to be adhered to now for the promise of continuity under a federation of Nigeria.
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Wright, D.S (1992),”Democracy & Federalism in the USA: Inter-Governmental Patterns, Policies and Perspectives.” In Democratization in Nigeria, schedule of seminar jointly organized by UNC Charanlotte and OAU, lle-Ife, sponsored by USIS.
NEWS PAPERS
The Guardian, Wednesday, April 14, 1999 The Guardian, Saturday, December 11,2004 The Guardian, Wednesday, December 15,2004 The Guardian, Friday, December 17,2004 The Guardian, Tuesday, December 21, 2004 The Guardian, Tuesday, January 4, 2005